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NO. 2062

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JPRS 74838

28 December 1979

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2062



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BAHA'-AL-DIN COMMENTS ON LEGAL, MORAL ASPECTS OF IRAN CRISIS

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 3 Dec 79 p 3

[Article by Ahmed Bahauddin]

[Text] By AHMED BAHAUDDIN  
If the proverb "crises are solved when they aggravate" does not prove true in a few days, then this means that an armed conflict is imminent somewhere and in some way between the US and Iran. This is because the status quo between the US and Iran cannot continue for a long time.

It does not seem that either party is ready for any retreat and moreover it seems as if the two are trying to speed up confrontation and conflict, particularly the party which can concede more than its enemy, viz. Iran.

I do not mean that the party more capable of giving concessions is wrong, but probably the other one is wrong. When you catch a pick-pocket redhanded, you are the one in a more convenient position to drop the case than the pickpocket.

Proofs that the US was caught redhanded has appeared in the confessions. Several correspondence between the American Embassy in Tehran and Washington have been found in the Embassy. These proofs of correspondence were dealing with ways and means to let the Shah enter the United States. Among the suggestions to that effect was one about the ailment of the Shah. The correspondence showed that the Embassy advised its government to drop that cheating and that President Carter was very near to his Embassy's opinion, but the Foreign Ministry, under pressure from local American lobby of which there appeared so far Henry Kissinger and banker David Rockefeller, was supporting the idea. Kissinger was particularly involved in the affair being a zealot Zionist who is keen to push the US into tough confrontation with Iran and the entire Islamic world, in which Israel is living in fear of the danger posed by a big

Islamic country such as Iran.

The Iranian revolution in this context is wrong in "shape" because it has attacked an embassy having diplomatic immunity in international law. The American government is guilty in "content" because it is involved in all the Shah's sins throughout the 36 years of the Shah's rule and because of its exploitation of the Iranian situation and due to the fact that an open trial of its subjects will be a trial for the dark side of the American politics and because it formulated, in conjunction with the Western world, the laws which protect the billions of dollars robbed by dictators from the peoples under the western banking systems and because it resorted to cheating in the face of shifting the (dying) Shah to a US hospital.

The matter of "shape" and "content" is available in every convention and very law.

Police can enter a house and find a large quantity of drugs but the defendant may claim that the police had not had a warrant from the judiciary to inspect the house. The judge will acquit the defendant because the legal procedures were not followed on entry and inspection of the house. The defendant will be pronounced innocent according to law, but to the people, society and in reality he is a drug trafficker.

In this way we would say that the US is guilty in reality (content) while the Iranian revolutionaries are erroneous in shape.

The Iranian revolution has the key to solve the present problem of the embassy and the hostages since the problem of the American relations with Iran and the entire region will not be solved for many generations to come. Iran can speak out all the facts for condemning the US and can

politically achieve the same sentence of the court and release on its own the hostages who are not more than a token, but they are an unhappy token. When we speak about law and shape we are not speaking with conviction of their justice in practice but we think that in spite of all the falsehood of the international law it is in the end not in the interest of the strong since the strong (powers) are the ones who continually violate its provisions.

The Iranian radio replied very shrewdly when some Arab writers opposed the Iranian attack on the US Embassy by asking these writers: "Why have't you opposed when we attacked the Israeli Embassy? Is the immunity of the two embassies not emanating from the same legitimacy?"

This international legitimacy is a big force since the right of the Palestinian people is more legitimate than the right of Israel which usurped its existence with arms.

Khomeini's regime is more legitimate than the 36 years of the Shah's rule because Khomeini has come from exile with no provision other than the will of the people while the Shah was returned from Rome to Tehran by a military coup designed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

What are we to understand from this?

We understand that the international law has two interpretations, one of the strong and the other of the weak. But it is sure that the weak is in a better struggling position when the despotic strong has nothing more than force.

There is no doubt that the occupation of the embassy is aimed in the first instance to inflict the strongest possible jolt to the US potential or attempts to plot against the Khomeini revolution and it is not aimed at returning the Shah.



In my view this aim has been realised and the remaining part does not deserve the great risks which can result from the aggravation of the crisis.

I think Khomeini is aiming at realising three objectives, namely:

A revolution that was realised with the overthrow of the Shah.

Another more difficult revolution through which Khomeini is trying to scrap the international relations systems which favours strength at the expense of right and injustice at the expense of disability. It is in this context an international revolution.

A third revolution which is far more difficult is aiming at introducing drastic change in the face of the Iranian society in such a way that it becomes another society which, according to Khomeini, was not realised save in the days of Prophet Mohamed (Peace be upon Him) and Kalipha Ali Ibn Abi Talib.

Through these three objectives the Khomeini revolution can be analysed in a manner which would bring us very near to reality.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BAHRAIN CAUSEWAY FIRST STAGE CONTRACTED

Manana GULF MIRROR in English 10-16 Nov 79 p 35

[Text]

The Bahrain causeway project has been described as the biggest prize in the construction world for the next decade. But it has also been the biggest headache for many companies who have put in bids. They have gambled time and money on preparing plans which, if not accepted, will end in the wastepaper basket.

Mary Frings reports:

AS MORE than 20 international contractors await the arrival of tender documents at the end of this month, one major firm has estimated the cost of a Saudi-Bahrain causeway bid at \$1 million — not counting the one per cent tender bond required under Saudi Arabian contract law.

Jens F. Nielsen, resident engineer for Saudi-Danish Consultants, told me this week: "It is very expensive to prepare a tender like this, especially with alternative proposals, and it would be unusual if all the invited firms were finally to put in a bid."

**Drawings**

"It needs extensive field studies of the conditions both in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and a lot of planning."

Mr Nielsen was in Bahrain to make arrangements for

contractors' site visits and inspection of soil samples.

The project first brought him to the Gulf in 1974, and he has been stationed in Riyadh for the past two years, with frequent trips to the other end of the proposed causeway.

**Logistics**

"We are just putting the finishing touches to the tender documents," he said, adding that the legal conditions of contract were in Arabic and English, while the technical part was in English only.

The invited contractors will receive extensive reports on field investigations as well as specifications, a bill of quantities and drawings.

Total length of the causeway is to be 25 km comprising 10 km of embankments at water depths less than 6m, 12 km of bridges over deeper water, and 3 km of roadway

across the Bahrain island of Umm Nasan.

The superstructures of the five bridges are designed as steel box girders, with a steel deck beneath the asphalt roadway. This is where bidders have the option of submitting an alternative proposal.

But while it is expensive enough to work from drawings prepared by the consultants, an entirely different concept would require a separate team of engineers and designers who would need to familiarise themselves with local conditions, draw up new specifications and bills of quantities, and conduct tests on materials available in the region.

If it was decided to ship pre-cast concrete from outside the Gulf, this would simply add to the mammoth problem of logistics.

"We still think steel is the best solution," Mr Nielsen said. "But it has been decided to give the concrete people a chance too, if they can show past experience and prove that their proposal is sound."

### Screening

To prove that a company is capable of providing the necessary expertise can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars - even though they have years of experience behind them.

Expensive design teams can be employed for weeks on a single part of a project, and air fares between Europe and Saudi Arabia and Bahrain alone can cost six figures a year.

The sophistication of the causeway specifications adds to the bill.

When it comes to evaluation of the tenders, in about six months, Mr Nielsen said a

preliminary screening would reduce the bids to a handful of "interesting ones," which would then have to be carefully studied and compared.

The optimal construction time was four and a half years - but the work could be concentrated into a shorter period.

"This might be more expensive, but the contractor would be less exposed to inflation risk," said Mr Nielsen.

The estimated labour force required would be around 3,000, he said.

### Navigation

On the ecological effects of the causeway project, Mr Nielsen said preliminary studies of water circulation, salinity and water levels, conducted by Saudi-Danish Consultants in 1975 and 1976, had indicated there should be no harmful effects.

This was because the five bridges provided plenty of openings for tidal currents - unlike an earlier proposal, discussed more than 10 years ago, for solid causeways to enclose the whole area bordered by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which would eventually dry out and provide additional land.

Four of the bridges are designed for the passage of ships, with a 120m, clear span over the main navigation channel, west of Umm Nasan, rising to a height of 28.5 m. For the three other navigation channels a height of 15.5m is provided.

Saudi Danish Consultants is a joint venture formed in 1974 between Al Muhandis Nizar Kurdi of Saudi Arabia, and two Danish firms, Kamp-sax, and Christiani and Nielsen.

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BAHRAIN

EXPORT CREDIT MANDATE

Manama GULF MIRROR in English 17-23 Nov 79 p 1

[Text]

MIDLAND Bank has won the mandate for up to \$30 million of export credit, to cover British companies' participation in the \$120 million Alba expansion project.

The credit is backed by the British Government's Export Credit Guarantee Department at a fixed rate of 7½ per cent, and is handled through Midland's OBU in Bahrain.

There was intense competition for the mandate among British banks, but a spokesman for Alba commented: "Midland put in the most attractive overall terms."

Mr Peter Francis, manager

of the OBU in Bahrain, said Midland would be providing the whole of the finance. The 7½ per cent ECGD rate compared with open market rates of close on 16 per cent, he said.

The major part of the credit will cover the contract awarded to John Brown Engineering of Clydebank, for five turbine generators.

Saudi Arabia's Minister for Industry and Electricity, Dr Ghazi Al-Gosaibi, and Mr Abdul Aziz Al-Zamil, meanwhile took their seats on Alba's board of directors.

The board approved the implementation of Saudi Arabia's 20 per cent share-

holding, and also up-dated its charter.

Mr Yousuf Shirawi, Bahrain's Minister for Development and Industry, said after the meeting: "The new members will enrich the board with their wisdom and wit."

He said the board approved next year's budget, and expressed satisfaction at the continuing improvement in efficiency and manpower control, which would keep production costs down, despite inflation both at home and in the countries which supply Alba's raw materials.

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BAHRAIN

ALUMINUM BAHRAIN AWARDS POWER STATION CONTRACT

Manama GULF MIRROR in English 17-23 Nov 79 p 1

[Text]

ALUMINIUM Bahrain this week embarked on a new era of expansion, with the signing of a \$70 million syndicated loan agreement, and the award of a new power station contract, worth between \$16 and \$17 million, to John Brown Engineering of Clydebank.

A local contracting company, Al-Wardi Transport, also won a site clearing contract worth just under a quarter of a million dinars.

The loan, guaranteed by the State of Bahrain, was negotiated on very "fine" terms for a 10-year period with a group of 17 international and local banks. It was signed on behalf of the government by the minister of finance, Mr Ebrahim Abdul Karim.

Signing on behalf of Alba, the chairman of the board of directors Sayed Mahmoud Al-Alawi, said despite early production difficulties, confidence in the future of Alba had been amply justified.

Dr Khaled Al-Fayez, general manager of Gulf International Bank, who are lead managers of the loan with National Westminster, said the loan agreement was a demonstration of the banking community's faith, both in the future of Alba and in the stability and good management of the Bahrain economy.

He also spoke of a healthier approach to industrialisation by Gulf States after they had fallen into the trap of thinking "that too many chimneys blowing smoke in the air is the way into the 20th century."

He cited the participation of Saudi Arabia in Alba, and

Bahrain's joint petrochemical project with Kuwait, as signs of more rational development.

An Alba spokesman said after the ceremony that the company was satisfied it had got a good price on the turbines. Three companies bidding below \$20 million were on the short list — John Brown of UK, Alsthom Atlantique of France and Marubeni of Japan.

He added that US, Dutch and Norwegian bids were above the price level.

With to \$30 million of British export credit available, several other British companies are in the running for smaller contracts.

Development Minister, Mr. Yousuf Shirawi said the Bahrain Government had directed Alba to put together as many small contracts as possible on the civil side, to give local contractors a better chance.

● Dubai's aluminium smelter poured its first metal last week and the company said commercial production will begin in January. The Dubai smelter has an annual capacity of 135,000 tonnes, about 15,000 above Alba's expanded capacity.

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BAHRAIN

RECORD ALUMINUM OUTFLET REPORTED

Manama GULF MIRROR in English 4-9 Nov 79 p 39

[Text]

BAHRAIN stands to make record profits from its aluminium this year, with production running at five per cent above the smelter's rated capacity and prices on the spot metal market at an all-time high.

"A surge of business has brought the stockpile of ingots down to less than 15,000 tonnes — 10,000 tonnes below our projections," said Mr Sandy Ross-MacDonald, general manager of the Bahrain government's marketing organisation, Balco.

And he added: "The new sales, and the continued strength of world markets, has led to a substantial upward revision of our profit forecasts. We now expect to see a 37 per cent increase in the last quarter alone."

Balco's policy of stockpiling against favourable market conditions has made metal available for sale at spot

**By Staff Reporter**

prices of up to BD 720 (\$1,900) a tonne, several hundred dinars over cost.

But by next year, nearly half of Bahrain's offtake will be committed at contract prices to customers in the region, making the Arabian peninsula Balco's second most important market after the Far East. This way the buyer gets more stable prices, below the record spot rates of today, but the seller is insured against a market fall.

New contracts have been signed in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The first is with the State Corporation for Aluminium Semi-Products (SCAP). SCAP will buy 16,000 tonnes each year from January 1980, under a three year agreement with option to renew.

The \$30 million Saudi Cable Corporation of Jeddah has also signed a three-year

contract, for 6,000 tpy. Under this arrangement the metal is bought from Balco, converted into rod at Bahrain's Midal Cables, and then shipped to Jeddah for drawing into finished cable.

Comments Mr Ross-MacDonald: "With our existing contracts to supply Balxco, Midal, Alupco in Saudi Arabia, Arabian Light Metal in Kuwait, and Gulf Extrusions in Dubai, we shall be selling some 43,000 tonnes of aluminium in the regional market next year."

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EGYPT

DETAILS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN EGYPT

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI 10 Nov 79 pp 4-5

[Article by 'Isam Rif'at]

[Text] The number of projects approved by the General Investment Authority [GIA] up to 30 September of this year amounts to 1,072 projects with a capital of 2.578 billion Egyptian pounds, with investment costs of 5.315 billion pounds. These projects will provide jobs for 165,294 workers whose annual wages will be 199 million pounds.

From another angle, a report prepared by the GIA on the situation of the projects which have been approved during the third quarter of 1979 notes that the number of projects approved in the period from 7 January 1979 to 30 September 1979 amounted to 50 projects with a capital of 134.6 million pounds in comparison with 26 projects with a capital of 49.7 million pounds for the same period last year.

In the field of private and public free zones, 16 projects were approved in the period from 7 January 1979 to 30 September 1979 with a capital of 17.9 million pounds as compared to 12 projects with a capital of 16.4 million pounds for the same period last year.

The projects approved during the third quarter of 1979 were divided among 10 companies in the investment field with a capital of 37 million pounds; banks [literally "a bank"] with a capital of 5 million pounds; five tourism projects with a capital of 14 million pounds; two projects in transport and communications with a capital of 860,000 pounds;

- Two projects in health and hospitals with a capital of 308 million pounds;
- Two projects in the field of agriculture and animal resources with a capital of 5.5 million pounds;
- Ten projects in contracting with a capital of 14 million pounds;
- Two projects in the field of investments with a capital of 3.9 million pounds;
- Two projects in textiles with a capital of a million pounds;
- Three projects in alimentary industries with a capital of 2.6 million pounds;

--Five projects in chemical industries with a capital of 17.8 million pounds;  
--One project in the wood industry with a capital of 6 million pounds;  
--Three projects in the engineering industries with a capital of 6.8 million pounds;  
--One project in construction materials with a capital of 8.1 million pounds;  
and  
--One project in the petroleum field with a capital of 12.6 million pounds.

The [afore-mentioned GIA] report adds that an analysis of the agreements [on the projects] during the third quarter of this year shows the following:

1. Foreign capital registered tangible activities in the direction of investment and contracting projects and, in shedding light on the nature of these projects and their fields, we find that they will serve the fields of housing and construction.
2. The large amount of foreign capital means an increased confidence of foreign capital in the economic climate and the direction of capital toward the production projects which require, in turn, relatively large capital.
3. The flow of capital toward engineering projects in the field of making land reclamation equipment, the manufacturer of apparatuses used with solar energy, the production of motorcycles and, likewise, the chemical projects, [all this] has imprinted upon it the flow of technology into Egypt. Generally speaking, in 1979, these projects flowed in the direction of production such as the fertilizer industry and chemical materials used in the iron and steel industry and not toward the plastic industries as in the previous periods.

In this period, there are nine companies which will move technology into Egypt. They are:

1. The American Dupont Co [in English] for petrochemical oil.
2. The Crush [in English] Company in the alimentary industries.
3. The International Paint Co. [in English] for producing marine paints.
4. The Ford Co. for producing light and intermediate lorries.
5. The Schlumberger Co. for locating the locales and quantities of petroleum and gas reserves by [use of] computers.
6. The German W. Korf Industrie Und Handel [in English] Co. for rolling reinforced iron.
7. The [German] Hoechst A.G. Co. for producing synthetically resin emulsions for use in the textile industry and dyeing.
8. The French Hutchinson Co. for producing high pressure hoses and radiators.
9. A permit from the Japanese Honda Co. to produce Honda motorcycles.

In regard to the free zones--the number of projects approved during the third quarter of this year is 16 as compared to 12 projects for the same period last year--it is clear that 62 percent of those approved are projects for storing building materials and projects for navigation services. This is in



keeping with the policy of limiting storage projects in the public free zones to the storage of production commodities and strategic materials which signals a proportional reduction resulting from limiting the approval of storage projects in the private free zones. This has [in turn] led to the proportional reduction in total capital in this area.

It should be noted that since the beginning of 1979 there has been an increase in projects specializing in the field of building materials industries whose number reached 7 projects with a total capital of 31 [possibly 21] million pounds. In the same period for 1978, there were 4 projects with a total capital of about 5 million pounds.

In the field of alimentary industries note the increased number of projects and the relatively large amount of their capital. Since the beginning of 1979 until now there were 4 projects with a capital of about 10 million pounds whereas since the beginning of 1978 up to 30 September 1978, there were 3 projects with an approximate total capital of a million pounds.

CSO: 4802

IRAN

AMBASSADOR TO USSR GIVES VIEW ON CRISES

Soviet Opposition to Oil Well Occupation

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 21 Nov 79 p 12

[Text] In an interview, Mr Mohammad Mokra, ambassador of the Iranian Islamic Republic to the USSR, declared: "The Iranian Revolution has been exerting a growing influence on Islamic and eastern countries."

Mr Mokra added: "Although some of these countries have special political systems and might have viewed our Revolution with terror, they are well disposed towards it, support it, and even wish to join it. And, in the light of this, the West has become apprehensive that Islamic governments maintaining good relations with the West (or at least not opposing them), might join their nations and, for the first time since the Crusades, the West might lose its domination of Islamic countries."

Mr Mokra outlined imperialist propaganda tactics in Iran, such as the establishment of various religious organizations and sects. As an illustration, he mentioned the Bahais and Zionists, saying: "Recognized groups such as the Bahais are not considered a threat to us and the Revolution. The real threat lies in political or religious groups who operate secretly, whose leaders reside outside Iran, and who are being guided and led by others. Nonetheless, because of Iranians' strong faith and conviction, tactics aimed at subverting them have failed up to now."

Regarding military moves which are reported to be going on in the Persian Gulf and the possibility that Americans might occupy Iranian oil wells, Mr Mokra stated: "Occupying oil wells is not all that easy and the United States can never take over all the world's oil wells: the peoples of oil producing countries would blow up their oil wells and, as a result, the West's industries would crumble. Moreover, both the USSR and western countries would oppose such a move by the United States."

#### Oil Crunch in the World

As to U.S. embargo on shipments of goods to Iran, especially the boycott of foodstuffs, Mr Mokra asserted: "At present the situation differs from that prevailing in the Mosadeq era when our oil could have gone unpurchased: now there is a worldwide oil crunch and all countries are seeking to purchase additional amounts of oil. Thus, there is not even the slightest apprehension that we might be forced to turn to the Soviets. Because eastern bloc countries need and are purchasing our oil, alluding to a boycott by the United States is nothing but a threat. If necessary we shall offer to buy foodstuffs from all the world, including the USSR. We are fighting the U.S. government and the USSR will surely support our struggle, at least to bolster up its own political system. Naturally we oppose any interference on the part of any country and our struggle against the United States is not aimed at pleasing the USSR: should the Soviets wish to interfere in our internal affairs we shall fight them as well. We consider the American people as our friends and harbor no enmity towards them. We merely wish that the U.S. government and other governments respect our freedom and independence."

Concerning the announced repeal of Sections 5 and 6 of the 1920 Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty, Mr Mokra affirmed: "There has been a controversy about these two Sections from the very outset: they have been aimed at forestalling counterrevolutionary activity against the Soviet regime on the part of White Russians residing in Iran. This issue has now become academic: no danger emanating from Iran has been threatening the USSR for years. The announced abrogation of those two Sections will have no effect on Iranian-Soviet good neighborly relations: we are now reviewing all agreements signed during the previous regime in order to bring them in line with the goals of our Revolution."

#### Gas Price Hike

As for exports of Iranian gas to the USSR, Mr Mokra pointed out: "Negotiations to raise the price of gas are still ongoing. They are expected to succeed."

Regarding the expansion of Isfahan's steel mill, Mr Mokra declared: "The USSR has pledged to provide greater assistance to expand that plant and make it economical and, at the same time, to gradually replace Soviet specialists with Iranian ones."

Concerning the Soviet people's reaction, especially that of its Moslem citizens, towards recent Iranian developments, Mr Mokra said: "We are a Moslem country sharing spiritual, cultural, and historical ties with a segment of the Soviet population. And our friendship towards a portion of the Soviet Union is actually extended to the whole of the USSR. We wish to maintain spiritual and cultural relations with Soviet Moslem republics. Such relations are in the interests of the parties concerned: our Revolution has had far-reaching effects on all the peoples of our region."

Impact of Islamic Revolution

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 21 Nov 79 p 10

[Text] On the heels of the announcement by the Soviet Government purporting to prevent U.S. military intervention in Iran, KEYHAN's reporter contacted Mr Mohammad Mokra, Iranian ambassador to the USSR, who had returned to Tehran for consultation. Mr Mokra pointed out the effects of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. We are reproducing below his interview in the form of an article.

In reply to our correspondent's question about the impact of the Iranian Islamic Revolution on the USSR, the possibility of U.S. military intervention in Iran, and Soviet reaction to it, Mr Mokra declared: "The struggle of the Iranian people is a human one; it has been carried out to seek justice and the redress of grievances for all oppressed and downtrodden nations. Since the Soviet Union considers itself a people's government and supporter of the toiling class, it cannot stand still vis-a-vis the Iranian Revolution. And it would appear illogical if, God forbid, the USSR might secretly fail us. The Soviet Union is not losing anything by supporting the Islamic Revolution and must be very pleased indeed with its emergence, but we did not launch that Revolution for their sake and our young people have not died to please Soviet policy. The Soviets should be very grateful that we have removed the listening devices and weapons which had been pointed at them with the connivance or rather initiative of the United States and Israel, that we have now joined the ranks of non-aligned countries, and have withdrawn from the CENTO pact. From the very outset we have striven to make our relations with the Soviets truly even-handed, bilaterally advantageous, and forestall Soviet politicians from instinctively thinking and acting as if they are the epitome of might and we are a country devoid of arms and atomic weapons. Again I must stress that in the past our bilateral agreements had been unequal and we had been oppressed. The previous Iranian colonialist government was only interested in preserving itself and, as hush-money, was bribing all countries of the world.

After the Iranian Revolution our trade exchanges with the USSR continued in the form of clearing agreements. However, we now wish not only to raise the price of our gas, but to bring it up to the level of the international market. We also wish to receive machinery, industrial and agricultural tools more expeditiously and more in accord with our needs. Finally we would like to see the Soviets (just like the western countries) refrain from bolstering their prices of goods exported to us. We have been conducting elaborate negotiations in that connection.

I strongly support a curb on the number of foreign experts, including Soviet experts, residing in Iran. To that end I have requested the Soviets and Iranian officials involved to arrange for the elimination of any foreign expert in Iran in 2 or 3 years so that we might gradually replace them with Iranian experts. I don't mean to expel all foreign experts from Iran right

away and halt all operations. Naturally those experts are employees of the Iranian government and are in no way involved militarily or politically. It is up to us to watch what we are doing and be able to attain self-sufficiency in industrial and agricultural sectors. Merely expelling U.S. experts (although their situation in no way can compare with that of Soviet experts) is not enough. We also wish to expeditiously rouse the spirit of the Revolution and independence among all the world's downtrodden nations.

We must prove ourselves in the technological field and demonstrate that Iranian scientists can match Western scientists in every field, creating and improving upon their own scientific tradition.

Science is not a gift bestowed by the Lord exclusively upon western peoples and the Lord has not created us as weaklings. Soon we must move from the stage of sloganeering to the stage of performance and production. It is incumbent upon our Revolution to fight all forms of colonialist and self-deprecating culture in order to facilitate the paths to progress of our scientific institutions. Under present circumstances, the United States and Israel are conniving with some western and even eastern countries (Moslem countries secretly supporting an atheistic philosophy), especially throughout the Near East, to plot against our Revolution, cause disturbances, and make military threats. The bolstering of military bases in the Indian Ocean and possibly in the Persian Gulf area is a potential threat against our Revolution, all Islamic countries, and even countries whose leaders are stooges of colonialist powers. The U.S. entanglement with the USSR, even if it were not openly military in nature, would lead to a political crisis throughout Persian Gulf countries. The bolstering of military forces in U.S. bases in Oman and especially the Strait of Hormoz cannot be devoid of danger for Moslem nations. We should forestall colonialist provocations and instigations within Moslem countries and ensure that the Iranian government does not interfere in any way in their affairs. It is the peoples themselves of Moslem countries who gradually but inevitably emulate our Islamic Revolution and join its ranks.

At present, two distinct countries, Northern Yemen and Southern Yemen, although having different political systems, have been coming closer together every day and are increasingly supportive of our revolutionary goals, especially since Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and U.S. facilities and bases in Oman have jeopardized their territorial integrity and independence. The government of Southern Yemen, although socialist and close to Moscow, is increasingly becoming more aware of its Islamic identity and has even incorporated Islamic theology into its constitution. We can take advantage of certain rifts among those countries and maintain constructive contacts with nations and governments which sympathize with and support our Islamic Revolution. We do not fear the U.S. military threat and, as you know, on the anniversary of the Soviet October Revolution, during my visit with Chairman Leonid Brezhnev, at the Kremlin, in the presence of the Supreme Soviet Committee members and Mr Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, I made it absolutely

- clear that the Iranian nation does not fear the 110,000-strong U.S. military force, that Iranians would fight the Americans until the last breadth, and that if the United States commits the grave mistake of attacking our oil wells or occupying a portion of our territory in the Persian Gulf, it would fail, and that I did not believe that other Moslem countries would remain indifferent.

- Chairman Brezhnev warmly and cheerfully welcomed my statements. His encouragement showed (or at least it was my impression) that in the event of a U.S. military intervention in Iran, the Soviet government would not stand still. I have had that impression in many of my subsequent talks with Soviet politicians. The Iran-American economic war would create a furore in all Arab and oil producing countries and would gradually undermine such countries' confidence in continuing to hold their assets in U.S. banks. U.S. reactions vis-a-vis Iran are childish and demonstrate the instability of U.S. economic and political system. Perhaps it has been God's wish to reveal U.S. political weakness to the whole world and enable a militarily weak country such as Iran to confront a military giant such as the United States, and expose the frailty and debility of U.S. economic and cultural foundations.

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CSO: 4906

IRAN

#### MEASURES BEING TAKEN TO REVIVE AGRICULTURE

##### Ministry of Agriculture Reorganization

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 24 Oct 79 p 8

[Text] During the time of the previous regime, only agricultural palaces rose; agricultural funds fell. We hope that, under today's revolutionary conditions, the country's agricultural funds will rise.

The agricultural system has been turned upside down and the Agricultural Council, the provincial agricultural organizations, and agricultural service centers will play an executive role in the new agricultural system.

By virtue of the plan which the Ministry of Agriculture has prepared and is about to execute, Iran will be divided into 10 agricultural regions, and each region will be supervised by one fully-empowered deputy.

Thus, the centralization of agricultural affairs will be eliminated, and all affairs pertaining to agriculture will be conducted in the appropriate place by agricultural officials, in cooperation with agricultural councils and service centers.

The plans for changing the agricultural system, the preliminaries of which have already been provided, will be implemented in two phases. The first stage is the study phase; the second stage is the executive phase. The executive stage will include the county agricultural service centers, in cooperation with the county agricultural council, and the district agricultural and rural development service centers in cooperation with the rural district council.

The new agricultural system will have six deputy ministers and one alternate and each one of them will have distinct and defined duties. The Minister of Agriculture, in addition to supervising all agricultural organizations and firms, will make use of the cooperation of the Supreme Agricultural Council, the Agricultural Coordinating Council, the Agricultural and Rural Development Coordinating Council, the Rural Research Center, the Service Secretariate and centers, and advisors.

The Supreme Agricultural Council will consist of the deliberation of the provincial councils, Tehran agricultural experts, and representatives of various offices of the undersecretaries. Members of the provincial agricultural council will assist the Chairman of the provisional agricultural organization, and the chief of each organization, like a minister, will have one alternate or deputy.

The county agricultural service center has a chief and the agricultural council will cooperate with this center, and the chief of the county agricultural service center will be an assistant deputy. Moreover, an itinerant group offering technical and infrastructure services and welfare facilities of the county rural research center will function under the supervision of the chief of the county agricultural service center.

In this plan, for the purpose of distributing responsibilities and turning over agricultural affairs to the farmers, themselves, special attention has been given to the expertise of the farmers and cattlemen of the county and an effort has been made to make the farmers realize their true value and take advantage of all resources in improving the country's agriculture.

#### New Land Tenure Regulations

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Oct 79 p2

[Text] Unutilized agricultural land will be turned over to all graduates in the field of agriculture, herdsman, pensioners, and government employees.

Two years grace period will be given to owners of unutilized land to develop their land, and applicants must submit their requests to the Department of Agriculture in each location.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development announced today the regulations for turning over unutilized lands: The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, in implementing the law entitled, "Manner of Turning Over and Revitalizing Lands," announced:

1. Since, according to Article IV-3 of the law, the rights of individuals over utilized lands is linked with the responsibility and duties that they have regarding the legitimate use and exploitation of that land and, if this land remains fallow and unused for three years without good reason, the Ministry of Agriculture is legally obliged to take action to reclaim the land and turn it over to agricultural volunteers; therefore, the owners of these lands should take note of their legal obligations and responsibilities to take steps in good time to cultivate and work the land and to refrain from leaving farm lands unused.

2. Regarding wastelands (outside of the legal boundaries of the cities) and unutilized lands and properties, with attention to Article VIII of the law, which is quoted verbatim: "Unutilized lands and properties that have been registered in the names of individuals, or are being occupied by them, from



the date of approval of this law, will be at the disposal of the registered applicants or occupiers for a period of two years in order that they might take steps to reclaim and exploit those lands. The grace period will be five years for registered applicants or occupiers of the lands. At the end of the aforementioned time periods, the lands that remain fallow or unutilized, and also utilized lands which, according to Article IV, appear to be unutilized, will belong to the government. The Ministry of Agriculture will take action, in accordance with the law, with regard to turning them over."

#### Revitalization and Exploitation

Occupiers and registered applicants of these types of lands will be invited to take the necessary steps, directly, from the date of publication of this communique, to reclaim and exploit the aforementioned lands and, in order that in subsequent inquiries their rights will not be violated, they should pay a visit and submit to the local Department of Agriculture, within three months, the specifications of the lands of occupiers with evidence of their registration, in accordance with the forms provided by that department.

With attention to Article XII, the law invites all individuals who, by 16 September 1979, the date of legal approval, have taken action to develop and revitalize government (unutilized), wastelands, and pastures and who are exploiting such lands without contract or documents of transfer, to visit the local agricultural departments within three months to complete and submit the prepared forms in order that, after the investigation by the three-man commissions (composed of representatives of the appropriate district council, the county agricultural council, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs), which will be formed in the counties, arrangements might be made to transfer those lands to those reclaiming them.

Regarding the transfer of the rest of the the government lands for the purpose of revitalizing and developing them, the priorities described below will be observed:

- Local residents who have lived at least three years in the locale
- Volunteers who make a commitment to live in the locale
- Graduates of agricultural, veterinary, and cattle raising colleges, provided that they are not employed by the government
- Government employees, provided that they leave their jobs through retirement or redemption of service

Within three months following the date of publication of this communique, while designating the locale of activities and the lands in question, and plans and programs pertaining to revitalization and development of the lands, volunteers can draft their requests in accordance with the examples which the agricultural departments in each locale will place at their disposal and submit them directly to the aforementioned departments so that action might be taken

by the three-member commission in each county in accordance with the regulations provided for in the law, which is being prepared right now, regarding the requests received and the pertinent plans at the time of investigation and with respect to transferring the lands to qualified individuals.

#### Cooperation for Rural Centers

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 28 Oct 79 p 12

[Text] Mashhad - "One production unit is being allocated to each village, and service centers will be established in several villages where they will be able to offer services to neighboring and nearby areas."

Dr 'Ali Mohammed Ayzadi, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, announced this news in a meeting held in Mashhad and attended by members of the Agricultural Councils and representatives of the cattlemen and farmers of Khorasan.

The Minister of Agriculture spoke at this meeting and said, "In these centers, farmers can make use of the services which will be provided with the cooperation of the Ministry of Power, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Ministry of Roads and Transportation, and Ministry of Posts, Telegraph, and Telephone."

He added, "The deputies of these ministries will serve with me on a coordinating council, and we will study problems from our respective viewpoints and we will even install one telephone in each village, and establish a multi-purpose mosque in each village which the people can use for worship, education, studying traditional customs and perusal of books."

He likewise said, "Service centers representing the Agricultural Cooperative Bank will embark on the simplest method of granting loans; veterinary technicians will be established in cattle and livestock raising locales; and, in the counties, too, agricultural departments will be linked with the organizational headquarters for resolving problems. Moreover, the agricultural councils in rural districts will function along side this organization, and another of the duties of the service centers will be to purchase agricultural products so that the farmers can, if they wish, sell their products at a fair price."

Dr Ayzadi added, "In order to eliminate problems pertaining to agricultural machinery, we have designated three companies for the purchase of three types of tractors since they will establish well-equipped repair shops in the counties and will import the needed spare parts in sufficient quantity."

The Minister of Agriculture said, "Many people are speaking rashly about the question of land ownership. Islam does not believe that, for example, one takes a milk-producing cow from one person and gives it to another; rather it says that the milk must be distributed among the people, and the mechanism of tithing is the highest system and establishes the stimulus for public welfare."

The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, during his speech, embarked on the details of the activities of the treasury fund and said, "This fund will be managed in the villages under the supervision of the council called the 'village council' and this council will be composed of six people, and one clergyman, teacher, or literate person will be added to maintain the account books and ledgers for that council and, in so far as possible, these six people, who will be elected from among those local, trustworthy individuals who are acceptable to the people, will manage the fund and, once each year, after the harvest, will review the living expenses of the village families, taking the number of family members and the minimum standard of living into consideration, and they will provide the necessary assistance to eliminate any financial need."

He added, "If the family income exceeds its living costs, it will pay into this fund religious fees, and the Imam has given the necessary instructions in this regard. It is to explain this same program that I am travelling to each of the provinces."

In this meeting, which the deputies of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the director-general of agriculture for Khorasan Province attended, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs said, "Some of the agricultural problems stem from the lack of resources for earning a living in the villages. This problem will not be solved quickly, and, to some extent, we need a rational and logical period of time to provide for these needs, because the system of government during the past 15 years tried to exterminate agriculture. We do not, however, expect you to wait another 15 years; but, it is necessary that you give us a chance in order that we might solve the problems to your liking."

The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development said, "The first problem is the lack of a guaranteed future for the farmer, and the former government, with the spontaneously generated laws that were approved and implemented, made the farmers lose hope and they did not know what tomorrow would bring. There are also problems pertaining to difficulties arising from agricultural machinery and its variety and, likewise, the lack of technical personnel. These problems have been given full attention by the government. I am asking you to exercise revolutionary patience and give the government a chance. So far, with the passage of 80 bills, the government has removed restrictive regulations that were impeding the farmers."

The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development added, "With the formation of the agricultural councils, you farmers can determine better than anyone else annoyances and dissatisfactions and, when you are not in a position to do anything about them, the Ministry of Agriculture will rush to your aid."

Dr Ayzadi pointed out, "The Ministry of Agriculture has 60,000 employees and workers who, for the most part, live in the cities, and more than 6,000 of them live in Tehran. While the basic work of this group is only in the rural areas, you see very few of these workers living in the villages and, thus, few inspections are possible."

Dr Ayzadi said, "All of the farmers' grievances must be eliminated, their income must be raised, their standard of living must be improved by encouraging agricultural work, and resources must be provided to encourage the farmers to stay in rural areas and to check their migration to the cities. This objective depends on providing for agricultural needs such as seeds, fertilizer, insecticides, agricultural machinery and agricultural credits. Moreover, agricultural products must be purchased from the farmers at a fair price and the necessary information and new training by promoters must be placed at their disposal. All of these problems have been studied and, in each case, the necessary plans have been drawn up; but, unfortunately, radio and television is not controlled by the government and therefore we cannot inform the farmers of the jobs accomplished as we ought and should. If you hear something on radio and television, you do not give the government credit for it because, with attention to the atmosphere that dominates society regarding freedom of speech, any university professor, or this or that individual, will try to hold a meeting on the pretext of being an authority. You, however, should not worry about any statements they make."

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ISRAEL

HIGH COURT DECISION CHALLENGES SETTLEMENT POLICY

Tel Aviv HAMODI'A in Hebrew 23 Oct 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Storm After Storm"]

[Text] Before the Israeli public had fully digested the resignation of Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, it was struck by the storm of the High Court's decision which unanimously held that the Elon Moreh settlement must be evacuated within 30 days.

There is no doubt that this decision will accompany public-political activity for a long time to come, whether because of its far-reaching significance in one of the most sensitive areas in which the government, and especially the present one, has concerned itself; or because of the far-reaching ramifications in the sphere of clash between supporters and opponents of the government, and even between circles constituting the government itself, for it is no secret that several cabinet ministers received the judicial system's decision with undisguised satisfaction, viewing it as a victory for the line which they had followed for some time.

This decision is most far-reaching, for it attacks the very basis of the government's approach, which always seeks to maintain that settlements in the territories do not have an ideological basis, but rather, to the degree to which they are built, they are built to respond to the security and military needs of the country. Opponents of the government's policy in this area have always claimed that the government's claim is merely a cover and disguise for the real motive, which is ideological, but that the government is forced to hide this for political purposes and harsh international pressures.

The judges of the High Court examined the issue from this point of view, in conjunction with international law governing the status of conquered territory. After hearing various testimony and opinions, they were not persuaded of the correctness of the military and security justification, especially because of contradictions between statements of the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Defense Minister. The Chief of Staff claimed that the strategic importance of the area in which Elon Moreh is situated requires the establishment of a settlement, while the Defense Minister, without challenging the strategic importance of the region, felt that security needs could be satisfied without establishing a settlement there.

This contradiction in the testimony of two persons holding the senior positions in the security area was the basic justification of the judges in accepting the claim of those who challenged the decree which ordered the seizure of their private lands. The judges linked this to the added fact that the settlers themselves, members of Gush Emunim, openly admit that their motive for settling in this place are not military and security, but rather ideological and philosophical. It is impossible not to accept the claim of the judges who say that if the defense minister is not persuaded of the security need, then judges cannot be persuaded.

Perhaps the response of Gush Emunim is correct, in saying that the decision is not against them, but rather against the government, since the government and not they adapted the security rationale, and that now the government must decide what to do. It is reasonable to assume that it will not adopt the position of Gush Emunim, and decide that henceforth all of the "land of Israel" is to be settled for nationalist reasons. The government cannot but see the scope of the whole problem, its political isolation in the international arena, and the heavy pressures being exerted upon it otherwise.

Moreover, if the government should want to decide upon settlement for "national reasons" as demanded by Gush Emunim, it will first have to decide on the annexation of the territories into the area of Israeli sovereignty, for without this every settlement will be declared illegal by the High Court, on the basis of yesterday's decision. If the security justification requires greater effort, and this too was rejected in the case of Elon Moreh, it is obvious that merely establishing a settlement in an area under the law of occupied territory according to international convention, will most certainly be declared illegal by the High Court. Could the government, under present circumstances, go as far as to decide on the annexation of the territories, in open contradiction to the Camp David accord, and endanger the peace agreement with Egypt?

Obviously, the decision of the High Court is accompanied by a bitter taste. We are very far from the conception of Gush Emunim and the fervor with which they invest their adventurist actions, even though they cloak them in one of our most precious values -- the sanctity of the land of Israel. We see no need to prove the love of Israel which burns in the heart of every pious Jew, but the higher moral decree of preservation of life is very strong, and if that imperative applies to the life of a single person, a fortiori the lives of many, and endangering the peace process and so openly challenging every international factor clearly endangers the lives of many.

Nevertheless, the decision of the High Court has a bitter taste in that it is totally severed from any spiritual link to this sensitive matter, which exposes the whole tragic contradiction of establishing a Jewish settlement on land which God promised to us in the covenant. The decision was made on purely secular judicial grounds, and views the right to settle only from the point of view of international law, and not from the strength of our link to the land or from the view of compelling forces of the reasons of preservation of life which have a basis in religious law.

This decision will cast its shadow on political events of the country in the near future, and we doubt that the leaders of the Alinement will be able to enjoy this development, since the decision also contradicts their approach to matters of settlement beyond the Green Line to the extent that it is not based on clearly provable military needs. Many of the settlements which were set up by the Alinement government were set up close to the political-territorial line accepted by them, but it was not always possible to prove the clear military need which is now required by the High Court.

The government now faces a wave of storms from all directions, both from within from opponents of this type of settlement, as well as from the opposition which will assault it against this background, and from members of Gush Emunim and those circles in the coalition which insist on continuing settlement in the territories.

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ISRAEL

EXPANSION OF SETTLEMENTS ENDANGERS SECURITY

Tel Aviv HAMODI'A in Hebrew 16 Oct 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Showcase Operation and Security Danger"]

[Text] Of all of the varied responses heard in the last two days regarding the government decision not to expropriate private lands but rather to use state lands for the expansion of settlements, the strangest and most damaging was that of Gush Emunim, which was not satisfied with condemning it by words but accompanied its words with a showcase operation by establishing "outposts" which required many IDF units to dismantle them in enforcing the law against violaters.

Of all of the elements which awaited the government's decision, it is precisely Gush Emunim which can be most satisfied with it, because in spite of everything, the decision gives a green light to expansion, in one form or another, of Jewish settlements in areas beyond the Green Line. The Gush Emunim members are well aware of the government's motives, as well as the pressures and limitations upon it and within which it must operate, and they should be the last to increase the burden on the government and make things so difficult for it in such an extreme and damaging way.

No one can accuse the deputy defense minister, Mr Mordekhai Zippori, of being alien to the idea of settling the land of Israel. He is a Herut member, a movement which has always maintained the idea of a greater land of Israel. If he can come and say that the operation of Gush Emunim is nothing but grandstanding which constitutes a danger and damage to the army and security forces -- then he has a reason for it.

Gush Emunim proclaims its concern for the security of the country, but in its actions it does the opposite. The Israeli government has enough problems and trouble in the international political response to its actions, in its increasing political isolation, and in the growing hostility towards the country, not only on the part of the traditional enemies of Israel, but also on the part of those who generally take a favorable attitude towards Israel and those who are considered friends of Israel. Is the concern for the future of the people



of Israel to be expressed only in isolated showcase settlements here and there? Isn't there any concern for other arenas and fronts? Must they alienate all peoples from us, and increase the hatred of Israel in the world?

It is no wonder that Israel's enemies were delighted with the government's decision, for to them this is "proof" of Israel's intent "to dispossess and oppress" the Arab people. But that is not enough for the Gush Emunim people. To the fire of hatred for Israel, which is growing in intensity, they add those operations which contribute nothing, not even from their point of view.

The result is that army forces are required to expend their efforts in evacuating those who build "settlements". And the deputy defense minister speaks bitterly of the many wasted hours of training of IDF people who must deal with law breakers looking only for publicity, while causing significant danger to our security.

There is much absurdity in all of this activity by the Gush Emunim members, and this absurdity finds expression in the fact that their settlement targets are only beyond the Green Line, while there is much territory within the Green Line which is exposed to the danger of an Arab majority, such as the region of the Galilee which calls out for Jewish settlement. If they are so concerned about losing land in Israel, why don't they put an emphasis on land which is clearly under Israeli rule, instead of on places where Israeli control is questionable. We speak of areas where the Arab population is large, the security danger is great, and the political damage is inestimable, to the point of damaging the peace agreement with Egypt. Why must they do all of this?

These actions, which increase external hostility towards us, as well as internal hatred among the populations of the country, constitute a danger adventure for which there is no justification. It is completely pointless to try to hinge this action to an "ideology" which stems, as it were, from the heritage of Israel. This is a superfluous challenge which causes only security and political danger.

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ISRAEL

GOVERNMENT FACES CHALLENGES IN WINTER SESSION OF KNESSET

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 23 Oct 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Knesset Session Opens"]

[Text] Already at the beginning of the Knesset winter session, which began yesterday, the opposition is planning several no confidence motions; its slogan will be the last session before the dispersal of the Knesset, for which there is no repair other than early elections.

Of course the coalition factions will frustrate this trend, not only with a majority of votes but also by implementing a foreign and domestic policy with a reorganization of the cabinet.

The resignation of the Foreign Minister and the High Court's decision on the matter of Elon Moreh require that the government have new personnel to improve its performance, as well as significant conclusions so as to enable broader settlement.

In the next two years, the government's ability to implement its policy on autonomy, economic and social problems, and to show credibility worthy of its name will be tested.

The religious representatives will certainly be immediately concerned with implementing the agreement on religious affairs, such as the law regulating kashruth, the anti-abortion law, the expansion of the authority of the rabbinical courts, laws enforcing Sabbath observance, and garnering a majority for a law on religious conversion.

The Jewish state is struggling for the integrity of its land, and at the moment the religious community within it is struggling to maintain the integrity of the people and a Jewish state. The struggle is in ways of education, as witnessed by the growing younger generation in religious schools and seminaries. The struggle is also in public means. There is no community like the religious-nationalist community in terms of organization and public influence. This will enable it to approach the goals of Judaism which determine the face of the state. This government must be strengthened so that it may implement its policies in the next 2 years of its term. We do not need early elections. We need an improved administration which will lead the country to its essential goals.

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ISRAEL

ELON MOREH SETTLEMENT BACKED

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 23 Oct 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Elon Moreh Will Arise Again"]

[Text] The unanimous decision of the High Court ordering the Israeli government to remove the settlers and their homes, within 30 days, from lands owned by the Arab village of Rujaib, is a carefully reasoned legal opinion of serious public-national significance.

The decision is directed against the government which, by means of the military administration, seized the lands of Elon Moreh. According to a memorandum of the Chief of Staff, military considerations require the establishment of a Jewish settlement here on a traffic axis of great value in the regional security system. The decision decides that the primary and principal motive for the settlement was political and not military, and according to the law, such a motive does not justify the seizure of private lands. One of the judges emphasized the differences of opinion between the Chief of Staff and the Defense Minister regarding security considerations.

Justice M. Landau said in his opinion that the religious faith and devotion of the settlers should be respected, but that had no place in the law of a secular state, in which the private property of both Jews and non-Jews must be respected. The scheme of Gush Emunim to settle in the heart of the land of Israel, since it uses private lands, must be rejected because of the prohibition of taking the property of others. Zionism supports the right of return of Israel to its land, without the displacement of other peoples.

Apparently, the opinion takes the position that Jews do not have the right to settle Judea and Samaria, even on barren mountains and empty lands for which money is paid, because of the challenge of the right of private property.

State sponsored settlement, which is an imperative for the Jewish state and people, on the land of Israel, the patrimony -- is it impossible to remove obstacles before hand by legislation which recognizes reality, in order to satisfy the desire of Jews, tens of thousands of Jews, to settle on their land?

It should be noted that the government has not given its opinion properly with regard to legal conflicts prior to deciding upon Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria, and setting out a map of settlements. It is not enough to proclaim that dozens of other Elon Morehs will be established, and it is not enough to stand on the principle that Israeli land will not be withdrawn from. Greater attention must be paid to the legal, military, and political aspects in preparing the territories for Jewish settlement.

This settlement has not expelled anyone from his land. It has prevented the expulsion of Jews from settling in their own land. It redeems parcels of land from those who never lost them to begin with because they had no inclination to till them. It expels the wilderness and establishes productive Jewish settlements. It is pure Zionism. This is how pioneering settlements have been established in Israel.

The order of the High Court was a serious shock, and counsel should be taken. First, a Jewish settlement must be established at Elon Moreh, where God said to Abraham: "I will give this land to your offspring." According to the Deputy Defense Minister, the settlement at Elon Moreh can be moved to a nearby spot, where the land is stateowned, without the complications of private property. This proposal calls for careful study. It is reasonable to assume that future settlement operations will be subject to careful legal research.

Also to be considered is retroactive legislation, which would deal with all of the claims which compose the High Court's decision, a legal proposal with a public political background.

Chief Rabbi Goren characterized this perverse decision as one which limits the possibility of Jewish settlement in all of the land of Israel. He has proposed enactment of a law enabling Jewish settlement on state lands in all areas of the land of Israel.

The government of Israel must consider the decision of the High Court, both in terms of the special case of Elon Moreh, as well as in terms of settlement in general. Such a consideration is urgent and requires practical conclusions. Its principled policy of unlimited settlement in the territories requires some official decisions.

In spite of the obstacles, Elon Moreh will be re-established.

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ISRAEL

ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENT PLANS CALL FOR 2,000 UNITS IN NEXT 2 YEARS

TA161158 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 16 Dec 79 p 4 TA

[Article by Yosef Tzuri'el]

[Text] About 2,000 housing units are planned for Judaea and Samaria during the current and next fiscal years.

According to an agreement reached by the Finance Ministry, the Housing Ministry and the Jewish Agency Settlement Department a special appropriation will be guaranteed to absorb 2,000 Jewish families according to the following order of priorities: first in Samaria, then in Judaea and finally in Gush 'Etzyon. Qiryat Arba' is not included in the plan because it is not handled by the Jewish Agency Settlement Department.

A letter recently sent to the Housing Ministry by the director general of the Zionist Federation Settlement Department states that the planning of 400 housing units will be completed by the end of this spring. During the coming fiscal year it will be possible to complete the planning of construction in 17 existing settlements in Judaea and Samaria.

It has been learned that this planning has been done with the approval of the Housing Ministry and the Finance Ministry "and there is no problem regarding funds or candidates wishing to settle in Judaea and Samaria." Only one problem could hinder the implementation of the plan: lack of land.

Some 3,500 families now live in Judaea and Samaria.

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ISRAEL

ORIGIN, AIMS OF 'SONS OF THE COUNTRY' MOVEMENT DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 436, 22-28 Oct 79 pp 35-37

[Article by Mahmud Muharib: "The 'Sons of the Country' Movement in Occupied Palestine: The Beginnings and the Travails of Formation"]

[Text] In 1972, the "Sons of the Country" movement appeared in Umm al-Fahm, a small Palestinian town occupied by Israel since 1948. In the second half of the 1970s, the movement spread out into the following villages: Kabul, Nahaf, Sakhnin, Kufr Kanna, Al-Taybah, 'Arah and Jit. Cells are preparing to establish the movement in a number of other Palestinian villages which have been under Israeli occupation since 1948.

What is the "Sons of the Country" movement? What is its *raison d'etre*? What are its activities? The answers to these and other questions will be the subject of this study. In this study, we have drawn on tens of publications and leaflets issued by the "Sons of the Country" movement since its establishment, in addition to interviews with founders of the movement in Umm al-Fahm.

Before launching into the subject, it is necessary to point out that another movement, namely, "The Land" movement, is similar to the "Sons of the Country" movement in terms of its *raison d'etre*, though not in its ideology, means of struggle and organizational setup. "The Land" movement appeared in the early 1960s, but the Israeli authorities, considering it an illegal organization, stamped it out by means of a military order, and by arresting or deporting its leaders.

There are, however, many differences between the nature of the conditions and circumstances which gave rise to the two movements. The following are the most important distinctions:

1--The "Sons of the Country" movement emerged after the crystallization of the Palestine national liberation movement represented in the resistance movement groups. "The Land" movement, on the other hand, appeared at the height of the Nasirite tide. As such, it was ideologically an extension of the Nasirite movement, dedicated to the idea that liberation would be undertaken by outside forces under the leadership of Nasirism.

2--By virtue of its background, "The Land" movement emphasized the Arabism of the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation since 1948, and asserted that their liberation can be accomplished through pan-Arab action. The "Sons of the Country" movement, on the other hand, emphasizes the Palestinianism of those Arabs and the intrinsic power of the Palestinian Arab people and their ability to liberate themselves and achieve self-determination.

3--The "Sons of the Country" movement appeared after a qualitative and quantitative change in those Palestinian masses characterized by the emergence of a sense of national consciousness. Added to this [is the fact] that those half a million inhabitants have not remained isolated from their Palestinian brethren. Following the 1967 defeat, they re-established contact with their Palestinian brethren in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the activities of the "Sons of the Country" movement are confined to the 1948 Palestinians [i.e. Palestinians in Israel proper], the form and level of the struggle and political struggle of those Palestinians are greatly influenced by events in the areas occupied since 1967.

4--The "Sons of the Country" movement started at the grassroots level and moved upwards, and was launched as a result of the daily struggle of the masses, whereas "The Land" movement started at the top.

5--Unlike the "Sons of the Country" movement, "The Land" movement had no organizational structure.

The last two points probably provide the answer to the question: Why was "The Land" movement not able to resist and stand up to the decision to dissolve it and declare it illegitimate?

The Local Conditions Which Gave Rise to the 'Sons of the Country' Movement

We will concentrate here on the conditions which led to the emergence of the "Sons of the Country" movement in Umm al-Fahm, noting that those conditions bear great resemblance to the conditions prevailing in other Palestinian villages, thereby enabling the movement to spread to those villages.

Umm al-Fahm is a sizeable village with a population of 20,000 people. Before the establishment of Israel, the village owned 175,000 donums of land. Israel, however, confiscated most of this land, leaving Umm al-Fahm with only 16,000 donums.<sup>1</sup> Like most Palestinians living under Israeli occupation since 1948, the inhabitants of Umm al-Fahm turned from peasants into hired workers working in Israeli factories and plants, in addition to working in the Israeli public services, such as hotels and restaurants. More than 4,000 such workers travel daily for tens of miles to Tel Aviv and other Israeli settlements to work. On the eve of the establishment of the "Sons of the Country" movement, those people were--and are still to this day--leading a life which can be described as at least hard. Until

that year, they had no electricity and they were subject to constant water shortages and disruptions--disruptions which sometimes lasted tens of hours.

To this day, Umm al-Fahm still has no town plan, because the Israeli authorities have refused to endorse it. There is constant shortage in classes, classrooms and schools. In 1972, the shortage in classes came to more than 40.<sup>2</sup> That is to say that more than 1,200 students were forced that year to receive their education outside the schools in rented rooms located in various parts of the village. The number of students using rented rooms has recently doubled. Umm al-Fahm also suffers from the lack of medical services of any kind as well as the lack of cultural clubs.

This bad situation, including the humiliation to which the workers who have contact with Zionists are subjected, not to mention the strenuous nature of their work and the low wages they make in comparison to the Zionist workers, led to a perennial state of resentment and restiveness and the emergence of a national consciousness and public opinion responding to the national problems.

This resentment, national public opinion and indignation against the Israeli authorities could not in the past be channeled into a mass national action because any such efforts collided with the "clannish" and familial pattern of social--and political--relations in Umm al-Fahm, and because there was no organization or movement capable of ripping apart those familial relations and turning the indignation and misery into organized national action serving the goals of the Palestinian people. The social pattern of relations in the village, especially among the older generation, has been and still is characterized by an inter-familial and clannish norm, although this norm has been somewhat shaken in recent times. In fact, the transition of the Palestinian masses from farming on the land, which is normally owned by the head of a family, to paid employment in Israeli plants and economic installations and establishments involves a process of undermining the familial pattern of relationships.

But it takes an organized force to put an end to the pattern of "political familialism."

Since the establishment of Israel and until this day, the Israeli authorities have been strengthening and nurturing familialism and sectarianism by providing facilities and assistance to familial and sectarian leaderships so that those "leaderships" may become Israel's props in the Arab community. The Israeli authorities discerned early on that it is fairly easy for an individual to free himself from the influence of the family and its political and social fetters--that is from its political tutelage--because of his ability to work outside his own community and because of the breakdown of the economic relationship between him and his family as a result of the confiscation of land. To compensate those "leaderships" for their lost influence--due, as we noted, to the confiscation of land--the Israeli



authorities granted them certain privileges, mostly in the form of the power to conduct and exercise "mediation and good offices."

On the other hand, the "familial" leaderships, in addition to their role of preserving backwardness and corruption and arousing familial fanaticism and chauvinism, associate themselves with the Zionist parties in the form of "Arab electoral tickets" to solicit votes for the parties they belong to during Knesset elections as well as to control the Arab local (municipal) councils with the aim of securing the chains around the Arab masses, assimilating them into the Zionist society, tearing them away from their own Palestinian people and imposing on them denial and renunciation of their own national character.

Those local conditions which pervaded the Palestinian villages, the defeat of the Arab regimes in 1967 which upset many previous notions and concepts, and the emergence of the Palestinian resistance movement as a movement of national liberation entailing a recrystallization of the fighting Palestinian personality, convinced many that they could not attain their oppressed national and daily rights if they did not join the struggle for the sake of securing those rights.

The young people began to wonder about where they stand in the midst of those events and what is their role in the general Palestinian struggle. They did not see in the Israeli Communist Party--Rakah--a party which could undertake the role to which they aspired or which expresses their national aspirations as an integral part of the Palestinian Arab people.<sup>3</sup> Although the majority of its rank and file is made up of Palestinians, Rakah operates principally as a leftist Israeli party dedicated to the cause of changing "the Israeli capitalist system into an Israeli socialist system."<sup>4</sup> In the early 1970s, Rakah saw the conflict in the Middle East as one among states, that is as a conflict which can be settled through a peace agreement among those states based on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242,<sup>5</sup> without discerning that the Palestinian masses wherever they may be have a role of struggle to play in the cause of self-determination. Rakah, therefore, confined its struggle to interpellating ministers in the Knesset, mobilizing a press campaign against the Israeli government, not the Zionist entity, and to distributing leaflets or holding rallies. It rarely organizes demonstrations, and when it does, it always seeks permission from the government first and holds the demonstration in an Israeli city, never in Palestinian towns or villages. Rakah pins great hopes on Knesset elections and regards them as one of the major battles it must wage, inviting the Arabs to vote for its candidates.

Those considerations convinced many young Palestinians that Rakah cannot be the vehicle of their struggle, since they want a struggling, collisionist party toeing a revolutionary line. They do not want to find themselves as part of the Israeli left, although there is a leftist majority among them, because they see themselves as part of the Palestinian national movement. They did not want to struggle as Israelis of Palestinian Arab descent demanding equality but as Palestinians who have their national and daily rights.

The 'Sons of the Country Movement' in Umm al-Fahm

The first phase was one of search for an alternative. It was during this phase that the idea of establishing a movement was first entertained. A group of young inhabitants of Umm al-Fahm, prominently Ghassan Ighbariyah, Hasan Jbarin and Muhammad Mahajnih, got together in 1969 and began to discuss the question of how to conduct the struggle and in what form. The young men began their activities in the form of group sessions in which they presented their political ideas to their friends and stressed the need for mass action to attain their oppressed rights. In addition to their political activities among their friends, those young men also tried to expand their activities by delivering lectures and presenting a national play portraying the situation among the workers of Umm al-Fahm. They collided, however, with the familial-political system which held sway in the village. As a result, no one agreed to give them a place in which to present their play, and they dissolved the acting group which they had set up. During that very period many of the nationally-oriented youth of the village who were chafing under the prevalent conditions were active in Umm al-Fahm, with each group going its own way. In 1971, for example, a group of young men published a local magazine in Umm al-Fahm under the title of AL-FIKR [THOUGHT]. The magazine appeared three times only in its bid to chart a course of its own.

With the passage of time, it became necessary to unify and bring together all those national groups. Unification endeavors intensified in 1972 when Ghassan Ighbariyah, Muhammad Mahajnih and Hasan Jbarin contacted the groups of young nationals who had frozen their activities and their alliance with Rakah because of their opposition to its policies, as well as the group which had published the magazine AL-FIKR, and discussed with them the political affairs and the conditions of Umm al-Fahm and the way to get rid of those conditions. The young men who accepted the idea of mass struggle joined the main group and formed the nucleus of the "Sons of the Country" movement.<sup>8</sup>

The founders of the "Sons of the Country" movement applied a successful tactic in their bid to win over the largest possible number of national forces. They did not advertise themselves as an established movement with a defined political program, institutions and so forth. Instead, they announced in their leaflets that a political movement is being built and that the proposed movement is open to the masses of Umm al-Fahm and any national who wishes to join. For more than 6 months, the movement put out leaflets and pamphlets under the name of "The Proposed Sons of the Country" platform. When the movement brought into its ranks the largest possible number of nationals it became the "Sons of the Country" platform.

The founders have drawn up a simple general program for the "Sons of the Country" movement. The preamble has this to say: "Taking as its point of departure the present bitter reality..., a group of young men set out to translate the current indignation and moaning into serious and constructive

action, taking it upon itself to enlighten the inhabitants and recruit them into a popular organization representing their will and determination and deriving from their very life. One look at the past and present is enough to explain the reasons which have led to this bad and shameful situation. The exploitation and fostering of familial chauvinism in our society were among the major causes which have set relatives apart and steered them away from the right path. The authority has been actively stirring up familial fanaticisms and setting up its associates in the name of familialism."<sup>9</sup>

Under the heading of "Principles and Goals" it was stated that the movement is independent, its aim is to mobilize the masses to defend their rights, it does not believe in familialism as a social system which can develop the village, and that it will "define its position very clearly on each question in which our village has an interest, whatever it may be."<sup>10</sup> The movement also called for the emancipation of the Arab woman so that she may take her natural place in society, and urged all the progressive national forces to cooperate in the interest of the country, making it clear that the movement will follow "a policy of action to attain our rights...not a policy of begging, imploringness and appeasement."<sup>11</sup>

The movement's program involved several areas: 1) Education; 2) Work and land; 3) the organizational structure of the village. In all those areas, the program described the situation, proposed solutions and explained the course of struggle.

A perusal of the program reveals that it is a simple and clear prescription for the unification of all the national forces that are not associated with familialism and the Israeli authority and its Zionist parties into a general structure of struggle for the sake of the country.

One's attention is caught by Article 4 of the program, which says that the "Sons of the Country" will define its position on each issue in which Umm al-Fahm has an interest. This was so stated to stop all those who want to turn the "Sons of the Country" into a local platform only. With this article they put an end to a debate that was going on among some of their supporters about whether the movement will be local or country-wide.

The second phase (1972) marked the beginning of intensive mass action. In 1972, Umm al-Fahm saw new political activities and struggle practices, in addition to political ideas and views that were unprecedented. On 1 May 1972, the "Sons of the Country" movement distributed a leaflet marking that occasion in which it explained the conditions of the workers and the villagers in general and the problems which they suffer. It prescribed the course of action: "...but the problems cannot be solved by means of a one-shot news conference, but by persistent work and persevering struggle together with the masses of the village..."<sup>12</sup>

During that same period, the "Sons of the Country" called the workers to a general meeting in one of the coffee houses for lack of another more

proper and suitable place. The movement distributed a leaflet signed by "The Initiative Committee for the Defense of Workers' Rights"<sup>13</sup> under the title of: "We Have Built Tel Aviv! Enough...Let's Build Umm al-Fahm." [Addressing itself to the worker] the leaflet said: "...there are 4,000 workers in your village, including 1,000 youngsters who are forced to work before they reach the legal age. There are 500 peasants who are tilling the land of others. It takes you 4 hours every day to go to your work and back...You must know that your condition is a direct result of a predesigned plan whose aim is to deprive you of your rights while making you carry out all your duties...We urge you to work for the establishment of a local workers committee that would seek by all possible means to eliminate the sources of your problems."

The movement was unsuccessful, however, in its bid to set up a committee for the defense of the rights of workers. That was due to their numerical and organizational weakness at the time, and to the priority they set to the task of first building the "Sons of the Country" movement before setting up other unionist organizations. Their failure to set up a committee for the defense of workers' rights did not deter them, however, especially since there was another sector which was suffering from a policy of suppression and of keeping them ignorant, namely, the students. On 14 November 1972, the "Sons of the Country" organized a demonstration against a visit by the then Israeli minister of education and culture, Yigal Allon, when he made a tailored-for-television visit to open a secondary school.

Visits by Israeli ministers and senior officials to Palestinian villages mostly occur as the Knesset elections draw near. Usually the purpose of such visits is to open a street or a school or to promise to introduce electricity in the village. The aim of such visits is clear, and that is to support the [local] hirelings and try to win the largest possible number of Arab votes for the parties in power. On that particular visit, Allon was received by all the agents and the familial leaders who are associated with the authority, in addition to the Rakah leadership in Umm al-Fahm.

In that kind of situation, the "Sons of the Country" stood alone against a large front of enemies. They successfully managed, however, to express their position and attack their enemies by using two methods. One was the distribution of a leaflet in which they stated their position on the [Allon] visit, and the plots which are being hatched against the people. The leaflet said that "those associates swear, probably by all that's holy, that Allon will contribute vast sums of money toward the building of a regional secondary school. They have pretended to forget that they have conducted a deal behind the scenes whereby they made a gift of more than 20 dunams of the village's remaining land to the Jewish Agency." The leaflet pointed out that "the authority's policy is designed to keep our sons ignorant on the scientific, civilizational level and the nationalist level."<sup>14</sup>

The second method the "Sons of the Country" movement has used is to organize a demonstration in which the main participants were young people and students

during the reception ceremony for Allon. The demonstrators shouted national slogans and slogans opposed to the authority and the agents, such as the slogan, "Shin Beth, out out, we want our country free." (Shin Beth refers to the Israeli intelligence service).

Actually, this and other national slogans were shouted in Umm al-Fahm shortly before that time, specifically on the first of November 1972 during the demonstration which was organized at the outset of the school year when there was a shortage of 40 classes in the schools. In addition to the shortage, a large percentage of qualified and eligible people were deprived of employment, while employment was given to those who have yielded to the authority.<sup>16</sup>

It is noted that the "Sons of the Country" during that constituent period was active on the local level in Umm al-Fahm and the country-wide level as well. In that year, the movement, acting in cooperation with anti-Zionist Jewish forces and some national personalities in the triangle, formed "The Triangle Committee for Solidarity with the Inhabitants of Bur'um and Iqrit." This came during the period which witnessed an intensification in the struggle to return the inhabitants of those two Palestinian villages to their villages and lands. The committee distributed a leaflet calling on the inhabitants of the triangle to support and help their Palestinian Arab brethren in the Galilee and declaring that "our success there in the Galilee would be a success for the triangle too, for the struggle is a common struggle for the sake of a common cause." The leaflet called on the masses to participate in a procession "to be held" in Jerusalem and to go to the villages of Bur'um and Iqrit to express solidarity with their brethren there.<sup>17</sup>

It seems that the "Sons of the Country" movement was imbued with energy, vitality and new initiatives from the outset of its mass action. In addition to calling for the establishment of local workers committees and joining "The Triangle Committee for Solidarity with the Inhabitants of Bur'um and Iqrit," it formed a popular committee for the defense of the land in Umm al-Fahm. I believe that this was the first time that the 1948 [Israeli] Arabs have formed a people's committee to defend their land.

These activities suffered a sudden and strong blow, however, following the arrest of three of the movement's founders. Toward the end of 1972, the Israeli authorities arrested Ghassan Ighbariyah, Hasan Jbarin and Muhammad Mahajnih on charges of membership in a fedayeen network. Ghassan was sentenced to 6 years in prison and Hasan to 4 years. The charges against Muhammad Mahajnih were dropped for lack of evidence, and he was released 2 months after his arrest.

FOOTNOTES

1. Pamphlet entitled "The Progressive National Movement," the "Sons of the Country" movement and other popular circles of Umm al-Fahm, 1978.
2. Leaflet distributed by the "Sons of the Country" under the title of "From the Heart of the Schools."
3. Interview with three of the founders of the "Sons of the Country" movement: Hasan Jbarin, Muhammad Mahajnih and Ghassan Ighbariyah. Interview conducted in Umm al-Fahm in April 1979.
4. The constitution of the Israeli CP, Rakah.
5. Record of the 17th Congress of the Israeli CP, Rakah, page 161.
6. Interview with "Sons of the Country" founders, op. cit.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Booklet, "The Proposed Sons of the Country Platform," p 1.
10. Ibid., p 3.
11. Ibid.
12. Leaflet signed by "The Proposed Sons of the Country Platform" and entitled "Enough of Expatriation."
13. A clear proof that the "Sons of the Country" was behind the leaflet is that the leaflet was signed by persons who were active members of the movement during that period, prominently Hasan Jbarin, a founder of the movement.
14. Interview.
15. Untitled leaflet by "The Proposed Sons of the Country Platform," dated 14 November 1972.
16. Interview.
17. Leaflet entitled "From the Heart of the Schools," op. cit.

[The following, a leaflet of the "Sons of the Country" movement, is an inset in the above article:]

#### Statement on the Sadat Visit

The attention of the masses in the country and the world is riveted today, and rightly so, on the Sadat visit to Israel. Many sincerely expect the visit to blaze a path to the peace that everyone is talking about.

Can this visit fulfill those expectations?

We say no.

That is because the essence of the present conflict in the Middle East is not the conflict between Egypt and Israel, but the result of the dispossession of the Palestinian Arab people of their homeland, their expulsion from their land and their deprivation of the natural right to live and exist as a people, in addition to denying them their national and humanitarian rights.

The aim of the Sadat visit is to overcome "the administrative problems" and to circumvent the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the sole recognized representative of the Palestinian Arab people.

Even if Sadat succeeded in his bid to gain Begin's consent to return Sinai to Egypt, or conversely if Begin succeeded in extracting from Sadat strips of Sinai, the Palestine question will remain unsolved. In other words, there would be no peace.

The road to peace passes through the point of recognizing the right of the Palestinian Arab people to self-determination and return to their homeland and the exercise of that right. Any agreement that may be achieved behind the back of the Palestinian Arab people or at their expense, and without the participation of their recognized representative, the PLO, will not bring peace to the region and would be a prelude to a new war.

As long as the living conditions of the sons of the Palestinian Arab people who live within the framework of Israeli domination continue to be anchored in land confiscation, the destruction of houses, settlement, the Judification of the Galilee, suppression of basic human rights and the killing of inhabitants, such as the seven victims who fell on the Day of the Land and in Majd al-Kurum, then any talk about peace, either in Jerusalem, Cairo, Geneva or any other place, will be no more than an act of deception and of throwing dust in the eyes of the masses that thirst for peace.

The road to peace goes through Palestine, not through Sadat.

Date: 19 November 1977. A leaflet of the "Sons of the Country" movement.

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CSO: 4802

ISRAEL

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE COLONIZATION PROGRAM DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Oct 79 p 9

[Article by Ze'ev Shif]

[Text] What is unique about the Ministry of Defense's colonization program for Judea and Samaria, and how is it different from the program of Minister Sharon and the Gush Emunim? Are the objectives of the two programs fundamentally different, or just the methods?

In conversations with the defense managers we hear definitions such as: Our program is unique because it is based on having more Jews in Judea and Samaria, but fewer settlements. Instead of small mushrooming settlements with their problems, it is based on centers. Or: Our program is a kind of enlarged Allon program, whose aim is to avoid penetrating the crowded centers of the Arab population.

At first look it is clear that the colonization program of the Defense Ministry, which is integrated with the deployment programs of the IDF, is striving for less friction with the Arabs of the region and for a minimum of expropriation of private land. The point of view of this program includes more from the standpoint of economics and planning. It is a more "balanced" program than that of Gush Emunim. But it would be a mistake to attribute to it what it does not contain.

The Defense Ministry's program is also intended to perpetuate the Israeli hold on Judea and Samaria, although by another method. Although it wants to stay away from the Arab population centers, it cannot be said that it resembles the Allon program. For the Defense Ministry's program speaks of "a meaningful presence in the heart of Samaria." According to the evaluation of the program's proponents, there is enough government land to achieve this goal, without settling at the entrance to Nabulus or in the suburbs of Ram'allah.

Consolidation in Centers

The colonization program of the Defense Ministry did not come into existence only when a Likud minister of defense was appointed. Already



during the time of Shim'on Peres, the planning wing of the general staff, which had been entrusted with matters of national security, had prepared a general security-colonization program. This program was subsequently presented to Minister Weizmann, went through some modifications, and was worked out in more detail.

The planners list several fundamental principles. First, they emphasize that instead of dozens of small settlements, the program proposes to deal with a limited number of large civilian centers, each numbering thousands of inhabitants. The small settlements among them would be saved because they could depend on the centers for employment and services.

Another fundamental principle is to avoid as far as possible entering regions that are densely populated by Arabs. Apparently, this principle was established because of practical needs, such as the need to minimize political difficulties. This can be learned from the fact that one of the two political aims mentioned in the program is, as we said, a meaningful and stable presence of Jews in Samaria. The second political aim is "the strengthening of the Jerusalem region."

From a security standpoint it is said that large centers are easier to defend, and themselves contribute to the security of the region. The program fits the security point of view, and dovetails with the deployment of the military infrastructure.

From an economic standpoint the proponents of the program point to future advantages. District centers will make possible a better and less expensive development of the infrastructure (water, electricity, communications, roads, convenience services, transportation, employment, and the like). During the first stage they will depend on the Israeli population centers in the Jerusalem region and the coastal plain; subsequently, they will develop independently. Large centers will, they say, encourage private initiative in providing jobs and housing. Thus the circle of people involved in the affairs of Judea and Samaria, and not necessarily in political problems, will be enlarged. And finally, because we are speaking of a limited number of districts, the proponents of the program estimate that the land question will be less complicated.

In the first stage six such centers were mentioned, but after the update last April a seventh in Judea-Samaria was added. Now they speak of two district centers in the Gaza strip, whose importance is increasing now that it has been decided that Israel will withdraw from the Rafah salient. One of the centers will be located in the Qatif region, and the other further north, near Ziqim (Mahsom Erez).

#### Belts of Jewish Settlements

The centers in Judea and Samaria will be in two large blocks. Three will be in the Jerusalem region, and with the update there will be an additional center, named Ma'on Carmel, in the southern part of the Hebron hill country.

The second block, which will be in the heart of Samaria, will contain three centers. The Jerusalem block will consist of the Gush Etzyon center; the Ma'aleh 'Adumim center, on the Jerusalem-Jericho axis, containing tens of thousands of dunams of government land, and where a military industrial enterprise is already operating; and the Giv'on center in the Jerusalem area, west of Neve Ya'akov, on the planned Ben Shemen-'Atarot axis.

Inspection of the map indicates that the planning and likewise the implementation in the area are intended to surround Jerusalem with two belts of Jewish settlements. The inner belt consists of greater Jerusalem, 'Atarot, Neve Ya'akov, Giv'on, and 'Azarya. The outer and broader belt is that of Ma'aleh 'Adumim, Gush Etzyon, and Bet Horon.

The Samaria block consists of the Qarne Shomron center, about 20 kilometers from Kfar Sava; the Heres center, about 25 kilometers from Petah Tiqva, along the main trans-Samaria road that runs from Petah Tiqva to Ma'ale 'Efrayim in the Jordan valley; and the Nebi Salah center, southwest of Heres.

From the military geographical standpoint it is clear that the program planners established the settlement blocks in several belts. The easternmost is that in the Jordan valley (the Allon program), which is joined to the Judean desert and the southern part of the Hebron hill country (Ma'on Carmel). Then come the two belts mentioned above that encircle Jerusalem. The western strip, bordering the coastal strip, is located almost entirely in the extreme western part of Samaria. All the settlements are in the region south of Qalqiliya, and to the north, partly in the Green Line area, is the block of Gilbo'a settlements. These strips are joined by a network of roads, many of which are of strategic importance.

The most important of these is the trans-Samaria axis, which as we have said joins the center of the coastal plain with the center of the Jordanian border. This is not the only corridor that bisects Judea and Samaria. North of Jerusalem is the Ben Shemen-'Atarot road, and near Gush Etzyon is the 'Emeq Ha'alah-Teqoa' axis. The settlements are located mainly at the two ends of the axis and near the important junctions.

In this way military control of the principal junctions would be attained. In addition to the transverse (east-west) axes, there are also several important longitudinal (north-south) axes; the most notable of these is the Allon axis, almost the entire length of which can be traveled in the hills that overlook the Jordan valley.

#### The Plan Has Not Been Realized

The program is being implemented piecemeal, depending on budgets and manpower, just as the Allon program was implemented even though the government never officially authorized its complete version. So far one may count 57 settlements in Judea and Samaria, of which 23 are in the Jordan valley. In spite of the controversy in the government concerning enlarging

six of the settlements, it is clear that the subject has not thereby been closed. The Ministerial Council on Colonization Matters has already authorized the establishment of additional settlements, although the number and the locations have not yet been announced officially. When the colonization program was prepared in the Defense Ministry it was estimated that in 1980 the Jewish population of Judea and Samaria would reach 20,000. This forecast has not come true. It is doubtful whether the other forecast in the program, that the Jewish population in Judea and Samaria would reach 120,000 by 1988, can materialize.

This is the planning picture from the military and colonization standpoints. The political problem is something else. Will the Palestinians and the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria be ready to conduct conversations on autonomy with us when the Israeli government is implementing such a colonization program? And if so, the demographic interpretation of this program can only be a bear hug, the unavoidable outcome of which will be a binational state.

9045  
CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

POLL SHOWS ISRAELIS WILLING TO CUT THEIR LIVING STANDARDS

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Nov 79 p 3

[Article by Mark Segal]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. — Seventy per cent of the population are willing to lower their living standards for the good of the country, according to the latest Modi'in Ezrahi poll conducted for *The Jerusalem Post*.

The poll was held about a fortnight ago among 1,305 adults. It found that 70.6 per cent of the respondents would be willing to reduce their standard of living if it helps solve the nation's economic difficulties; 27.5 per cent would not be willing to do so; and 1.9 per cent had no opinion.

The poll also shows that the public has high expectations of Finance Minister Yigael Hurvitz, who has set off with the goodwill of just under half of those questioned. It showed that incumbency always influences public opinion, for Hurvitz soared nine-fold since last month, while former Finance Minister Simha Ehrlich has dropped near bottom by a similar ratio.

Significantly, the poll showed a shift of 25 per cent among those who last time declared themselves undecided or "don't knows" to support of Hurvitz. However, it must be noted that the poll was conducted by the Modi'in Ezrahi applied research centre during the changeover at the Treasury, but before Hurvitz announced his tough new measures.

Centre director Amiram Yarkoni pointed out that perusal of polls over a stretch of years indicated that Hurvitz was being launched with a high level of expectation. Finance ministers are usually the least popular figures of all governments, and this percentage topped even Premier Menahem Begin's popularity — but not that of Defence Minister Ezer Weizman.

Yarkoni said that apart from Levinson, who has retained runner-up status at a permanent four-plus per cent over a lengthy period, there appear to be no other firm candidates for finance minister.

Yarkoni found little difference of opinion among age-groups, religious and secular, or even voters for the various parties (except for Agudat Israel where only 62.5 per cent were amenable to sacrifices for the national good).

However, he did discern less enthusiasm among lower income groups, blue collar workers and the Oriental communities.

The higher up the income scale, the greater the readiness to cut living standards. Thus 55.3 per cent of those earning up to IL8,000 a month answered "yes" to the question, compared to 79.7 per cent of those earning over IL12,000 a month. Jerusalemites (68.1) and residents of new townships (66.0) were less enthusiastic about the prospect of cutting living standards than the rest of the country.

**Whom do you most favour as  
Finance Minister?**

	Nov. poll %	Sept. poll %
Yigael Hurvitz	47.1	5.2
Ya'acov Levinson	4.3	4.1
Simha Ehrlich	1.4	0.7
Avraham Shavit	0.8	0.8
Gad Ya'acobi	0.8	—
Yehezkel Flomin	—	1.0
the late Y. Rabinowitz	—	4.3
Others	2.8	7.0
Undecided/don't know	43.8	67.9

CSO: 4820

ISRAEL

WOMEN WILL QUIT UNLESS INCOME TAX LAWS AMENDED

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 11 Nov 79 p 2

[Article by Michal Yudelma]

[Text]

If income tax laws are not changed, many women will be forced to leave the work force and return home, the secretary-general of Na'amat, Nava Arad, warned last week.

She said that the present income tax laws discriminate against married women and divorced and widowed mothers, and that Na'amat demanded that these laws be urgently amended.

Na'amat is the roof body of women's organizations.

The rising costs of child-care and household maintenance are making it increasingly difficult for mothers to keep a job, Arad said. She demanded that working mothers receive two credit points (nekudot zikul) for every child instead of the one point now granted, and that divorced or widowed mothers receive an extra point.

Income tax laws should distinguish between the pension and work income received by widows, Arad said.

A woman working with her husband in their own business, farm or

plant is doubly taxed: the present laws deprive her of credit points for children and levy a high tax on her income, which is calculated as part of her husband's income, Arad said.

Israel is acutely in need of more women workers, who presently make up only 34 per cent of the work force, while in Japan and West Germany, as well as other European countries they constitute almost 50 per cent. Unfavourable working conditions in Israel deter many women from even trying to get a job, Arad said.

Other discriminatory tactics include the fact that women are paid only 60 per cent of men's salaries, slower promotion, non-compliance with existing labour laws concerning women, and a retirement age five years lower than for men, she added.

CSO: 4820

ISRAEL

NEW DRINKING WATER PLANT FOR EILAT

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 15 Nov 79 p 3

[Article by Ya'Acov Friedler]

[Text]

HAIFA. — A new, reversed osmotic water desalination plant, developed by Mekorot engineers, is producing drinking water for Eilat at IL15 a cubic metre. It now costs IL25 a cubic metre to produce potable water. The plant uses less energy and requires less maintenance than conventional plants.

Mekorot spokesman Mordechai Yacobovitch told the Haifa Rotary Club yesterday that the plant is still in the trial stage. It is now producing 1,100 cubic metres of distilled water daily, in addition to Eilat's production of 7,200 cubic metres of drinkable water a day. Output is hoped to be increased to 2,500 cubic metres of water.

The plant now processes saline ground water just north of Eilat. If the process can be adapted for seawater, it will be a major breakthrough, he said.

However, desalinated water at IL15 a cubic metre of water is still too expensive for anything except drinking in arid regions.

Mekorot is anxiously praying for rain, Yacobovitch added. The records for the past century which showed several years of drought following rainy years are not encouraging, he said.

But even if we were to be blessed with a very wet winter, he said, the deficit in our water resources caused by last year's serious drought would not be fully covered.

"Our present water shortage is one of the worst in memory, while demand is going up. We fear that in summer we may have to sharply reduce the supply, and the biggest cuts will hit the farmers. Agriculture consumes up to 85 per cent of our annual consumption of 1.5 billion cubic metres," Yacobovitch noted.

CSO: 4820

ISRAEL

SHARON PROMISES TO SELL LAND FOR VILLAS

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 29 Nov 79 p 3

[Article by Yitzhak Oked]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. — Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon yesterday promised to sell Israel Lands Administration property at nominal prices for the creation of "villa-settlements" in the Negev.

After meeting with representatives of the Bnei Shimon regional council, Sharon said the settlements would be like Omer near Beersheba. The settlements will not be agricultural and each resident will receive about a dunam of land.

Bnei Shimon is a regional council adjacent to Beersheba. The proposed development will be northeast of

the Negev's capital.

The cost of developing the area and building the houses will be met by the prospective residents.

The project is open to anyone. The first stage of the plan calls for two settlements each with 500 residents.

Seven hundred people have already applied for plots in the first settlement, tentatively named Omer B.

CSO: 4820



ISRAEL

BRIEFS

NEW ELON MORE SITE--Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon says that a large Jewish town will be established on Jabal al-Kabir, which will make a considerable contribution to peace. He said that he could tell the Knesset that the transfer of Elon More to Jabal al-Kabir was proceeding as planned. Sharon was replying to a question by Mr Uri Avneri. Among those listening to the minister's reply was Deputy Prime Minister Yiga'el Yadin, who returned to work this morning. [Text] [TA121039 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 12 Dec 79 TA]

CSO: 4805

KUWAIT

BRIEFS

AMMONIA PLANT PRODUCTION LINE--Kuwait's plans to industrialise received a boost this week with the signing of an agreement to instal a fourth production line for ammonia at the Kuwait Petrochemical Company's plant. When installed, it will put the country on a par with industrial nations in output of chemical fertilisers. One million tons a year will be produced, mostly for export. The decision to build the new line came after experts reported that worldwide demand for fertilisers would reach record peaks by 1983, when KPC's plant will come on stream. Current world production is 60 million tons annually, but another 40 million tons will be needed within five years. Many ammonia plants will have closed by then, Kuwait experts believe, because they are too far from energy sources and the cost of fuelling them will be prohibitive. The line will be a joint venture with a Danish company, which has agreed to train young Kuwaiti engineers and technicians free of charge in Denmark. [Text] [Manama GULF MIRROR in English 4-9 Nov 79 p 11]

CSO: 4820

## QATAR

### DETAILS OF 1980 BUDGET REVEALED BY EMIR

Manama GULF MIRROR in English 24-30 Nov 79 p 12

[Text]

QATAR is to increase spending on basic and industrial projects by 27 per cent, it was announced this week in a record budget. Details were approved by the Amir, Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani.

Basic and industrial projects get the lion's share of the budget funds: QR 4,928 million as against QR 3,882 million last year. Allocations for financing industrial projects and building loans for civil servants total QR 6,693.2 million.

The budget is divided into eight sections:

#### Industry and Agriculture

Costs of state or state-assisted projects totalled QR 2,042.2 million of which QR 510.2 million was allocated to complete projects by Qatar Petroleum Corporation and QR 1,135 million was to repay industrial companies' loans.

#### Exploration

Money was earmarked for feasibility and economic studies on light industries which would be followed by setting up the necessary industries. The private sector is expected to participate but QR 20 million is allocated for Government promotion and development.

QR 377 million has been allocated to complete basic industrial services. These

include equipping the industrial area at Umm Said, planning it, setting up berths and quays, deepening waterways, developing guiding devices, protecting the shores and buildings for maintenance and services.

The Petroleum Affairs Department received money to maintain productivity of oil and gas wells, develop their production and undertake more exploration operations which need seismographic surveys and studies.

Provision was made for extending gas pipelines to supply factories, power generating stations, and desalination stations with their increasing needs for fuel.

Allocations were made for building materials and organic fertilizer industries.

Experimental farms are to be set-up to improve agricultural production and an agricultural survey will look at finding more arable land.

A search will be made for new water resources for irrigation and money is earmarked to increase the green areas of the country.

#### Housing and Public Buildings

QR 958 million was earmarked for housing and public buildings. Part of this was for completion of projects already under construction, such as government buildings for the Ministry of Information, Qatar Petroleum, the new hotel overlooking West Bay, Government residences at Umm Said, armed forces houses, houses for Ministry of Education staff, Health Ministry and Electricity and Water Ministry and the completion of 2,000 new "popular" houses.

QR 100 million was allocated for building loans to state employees who wish to build houses at West Bay. The public services and the infrastructure for the building sites at West Bay will be completed.

New mosques are to be built throughout Qatar and there are new construction and housing projects, such as buildings for the Advisory Council, the Ministry of Education, the Health Ministry, the Technical Centre at Umm Said and annexes to other compounds, the state's stores, civil servants' houses and houses for workers at the new hotel.

#### Social Services Projects

QR 229.5 million will be

spent to set up seven sports clubs in Doha and other cities, in addition to the Equestrian Club, a shooting club and a tourist marine club.

Funds will go to the Doha Tower, expanding and developing Rawdatul Khail Park and the zoo. Projects for beautifying Doha, installations for the Ministry of Information, including new television and radio broadcasting stations, relay stations and a new folkloric theatre were also included in the budget this year.

Beach cabins will be built in coastal cities. Qatar National Museum will be expanded and other schemes will be carried out by the municipalities of Wakrah, Khor, Rayyan, Al Shamal Town, Umm Sal Ali and Jumaylia.

Improvements will be introduced in the parks of Wakrah, Dukhan, Jumaylia Kaaban, Eiv Hailetan, Al Shamal Town, Wajba and Thakhaira, and to markets and other public utilities in Kaabam Thakhaira, Someisma, Khor, Wakrah, Rayyan and Al Shamal Town.

#### **Education**

Qatar has earmarked QR 527.2 million to upgrade education. Qatar University will be completed and new schools established for various educational stages in Doha and other towns, in addition to completing the programme started by the state last year, at a cost of QR

385 million, for construction of new schools in all parts of the country.

Funds will be channelled to the establishment of new mosques, playgrounds and annexes to the Faculty of Education, to Qatar National Library and to the Vocational Training Centre.

#### **Health**

QR 167.1 million will be used to complete and equip Hamad General Hospital and to build new health centres. Other schemes include expansion and modification of Rumailah Hospital, the dental clinic, the medical clinic in Wakrah, the Maternity Hospital, Doha Hospital and Umm Said Hospital.

#### **Electricity and Water**

QR 1,292 million was allocated for electricity and water projects. QR 742.3 million will be directed to increasing the capacity of Ras Abu Fontas and Ras Abu Abboud power stations, constructing power transferring stations and expanding the present power distributing stations.

A station for central control of water supplies will be established and the system generally improved.

QR 232.4 million was allocated for expanding the sewage network. Increasing the capacity of refining and pumping stations will cost QR 188 million. A scheme to use sewage water for irrigation through a distribution network will cost QR 38 million.

#### **Transportation, Communication and Roads**

QR 490 million will be used to carry out postal schemes and plans for harbours, civil aviation, communication and telecommunications and berths. A new automatic mail centre will be installed next year at Doha West Bay.

Doha harbour will receive QR 31.6 million for improvements. QR 64.5 million is allocated for expansion at Doha International Airport.

QR 118.3 million will finance the construction of a communications network through the Gulf marine cable, the coastal station for marine communications, a car telephones network and a microwave network with Saudi Arabia.

The amount also covers additions to the satellite station and installing a new satellite station.

The capacity of Qatar National Telephone Services will be increased by adding 50,000 more lines in Doha and outside the capital.

Qatar has allocated QR 233.6 million to improve existing roads and construct new roads.

#### **Other Activities**

QR 887.2 million has been allocated to assist land ownership and preparing for building and for the defence and security of the state.

CSO: 4820

SULTANATE OF OMAN

IMPROVEMENTS MADE IN COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

Oman 'UMAN in Arabic 18 Nov 79 p 31

[Excerpts] During the past 9 years, the ministry of posts, telephone, and telegraph has made the following accomplishments:

It has increased the number of telephone lines from 416 in 1970 to 16,000 at the end of the 5-year plan in 1980.

A ground satellite station in the district of al-Hajir was opened at the end of 1974. It has a capacity of 60 channels, which can be increased to 300. The station carries television and radio programs to and from the sultanate and links the internal districts with the external network by means of small ground stations, such as the satellite station in Salalah, which was put into service in 1977, and is connected with the ground station in al-Hajir by way of the satellite in the Indian Ocean.

The ministry carried out the following projects last year:

It expanded the telephone services of the Greater Matruh central from 2,000 to 4,000 lines. The work will be finished at the end of this year.

It completed the space links for television broadcasting for Sur, Nazwa, and Sahm by installing a ground station to receive the television broadcasts from the capital. It also installed equipment in the ground station in Salalah to enable it to transmit its programs to the capital. It linked the al-Buraymi area with the town of al-'Ayn in the UAE by direct local telephone service, so that charges through it are made for local calls instead of international calls.

A contract was concluded for the importation of equipment and apparatus to add 24 new telephone channels to the satellite ground station in al-Hajir, increasing its capacity from 72 to 96 channels. The equipment is expected to arrive in November 1979. According to the report of the International Union of Radio and Telegraph Communications, this station is considered one of the 165 best stations in the world.

An automatic Telex central with 1,200 lines was installed to replace the

manual central. This new service will be linked by 550 lines with teleprinters which are on hand at the present time. It can offer Telex service in Arabic within the sultanate.

#### Future Projects

The ministry has a project to use solar power for radio and telegraph. This project will provide the gas which is now being used to operate the microwave towers, and will save the time and energy which are being used to carry the gas to the towers by helicopter.

#### Posts

The ministry has increased the number of post offices and substations in the country from 27 in 1975 to 46 at the present time. It has also adopted a mobile postal service, special delivery service, and postal money order service.

During the current year, the ministry participated in the world administrative conference for radio in Geneva and the world administrative conferences for posts in Rio de Janeiro.

CSO: 4802

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

TALKS OPENED WITH HUNGARIANS ON TRADE RELATIONS

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 24 Nov 79 p 3

[Text]

Abu Dhabi, Nov. 23 (WAM): UAE Finance and Industry Ministry Under-Secretary Faraj Al Mazroui met here yesterday with the visiting Hungarian delegation led by Minister of Finance Lajos Fallofy.

The Hungarian Minister arrived here on Wednesday from Kuwait for talks with UAE officials on trade relations and international economic issues.

Mazroui explained to the visiting delegation various aspects of industrial progress in the UAE, and outlined the relationship between the public and private sectors, in response to questions from the Hungarian delegation.

The Under-Secretary told the Emirates News Agency (WAM) after the meeting that the visiting delegation had proposed the establishment of joint venture companies with the UAE, and the preparation of studies on possible industrial projects for the country.

He added that the Hungarian Minister had expressed his country's willingness to train UAE nationals in advanced technology, including the chemical, electricity and transport industries.

Mazroui explained that he had outlined to the visitors the UAE's interest in the development of infrastructural projects, particularly airports, ports, roads, schools and other public services, and that the country has now taken a first step in the development of the industrial sector of the economy through the promulgation of the industrial law.

This stipulates that local participation in joint venture projects should be a minimum of 51 per cent, except in the case of ventures which are govern-

ment-financed, in which case the percentage can be agreed between the UAE and the other participating government.

A second step in the development of the industrial sector, the Under-Secretary added, is a comprehensive survey of existing establishments, so that a plan for future industrial development can be prepared.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BEDOUINS RESETTLED IN LOW-COST HOUSING

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 3 Dec 79 p 3

[Article by Maghazi Shuaib]

[Text] Abu Dhabi, Dec. 2 (Al Fajr) The resettlement of Bedouins has made headway in the UAE. This is evident from the new villages which have sprung up in different parts of the state to provide housing, education and health care to the people who had to undergo many hardships in the past.

The Labour and Social Affairs Ministry has played a key role in this field. This is evident from the rise in social subsidies and the number of beneficiaries. The Social Security Law was amended to facilitate the construction of low-cost houses. Local departments in various emirates contributed their mite in fulfilling this program.

The Abu Dhabi social services department has also played a major role in the resettlement of Bedouins. This department allots low-cost houses which are implemented by the Public Works Department in new villages particularly in the western region. The construction of 2,000 low-cost houses figures in the next plan of the Public Works Department.

Bani Yas village is considered the biggest of its type in the western region as it has the largest number of low-cost houses. It may soon become a city as work is under way for provision of community facilities. The village is located 40 km. from Abu Dhabi on the Abu Dhabi-Al Ain road and is bet between Journafour and Al Wathba villages.

With over 500 low-cost houses, Bani Yas caters to the needs of neigh-

bouring villages. Despite the unpaved roads, it has the features of a town. A mosque and a bakery are under construction. The village lacks a clinic and a market. The four boys and girls elementary and primary schools are still housed in temporary buildings.

There are two types of low-cost houses in the village: one is old and can be identified by the sandy yellow colour while the other is modern and painted in white. A large number of white, low-cost houses is occupied by the Al Minaheel tribe.

Khalid Bakhet Al Minhaly, employed in the Abu Dhabi water and electricity department, and an official of the social services department thanked Sheikh Zayed for changing their lives. Khalid and 12 members of his family used to live in a single room until the department offered him a house in July last. Later his father and one of his brothers were allotted houses.

Khalid's house is spacious; it can accommodate eight persons and has two bedrooms, two lavatories, a kitchen, a store and sitting room. He likes the design of the house but considers the sitting room small particularly if guests arrive.

Life in Bani Yas has its problems, Khalid said. According to him, the village urgently needs a clinic because the nearest clinic is four km. away at Al Wathba village. He also favours the construction of another mosque.

Khalid is happy because the allotment of a house has not deprived him of his housing allowance. In his view, this is one of the facilities provided by the government to enable people like him to face the problem of rising living costs



UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

ADNPC LOAN--Abu Dhabi, Nov. 10 (WAM)--Abu Dhabi National Pipeline Construction Company (ADNPC) has obtained under an agreement signed today with a group of companies, a 15-million dirham loan supervised by the National Bank of Abu Dhabi. The loan to be repaid over four years, will be used to purchase necessary equipment and machinery for the company. The executive President of NBAD Assad Samar, who signed on behalf of the bank, said the loan is within the context of bank's policy to finance national and local projects with Arab and national capital to consolidate the UAE economy. ADNPC has been established last year to construct and maintain oil and associated pipelines and the pumping, injection and pressure stations. Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) contributes 60 per cent of the company's capital and the remainder is contributed by a French company. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 11 Nov 79 p 3]

SURPLUS TRADE BALANCE--Abu Dhabi, Nov. 14 (WAM)--The UAE had a surplus trade balance of 10.31 billion dirhams during the first half of this year compared with 9.35 billion dirhams during the first half of 1978, according to a report by the Currency Board. The Currency Board, the Economy and Commerce Ministry and the Planning Ministry have completed studies on the development of UAE's foreign trade during 1978, including an assessment of the balance of payments for 1978 and the first half of 1979. The Currency Board's recent bulletin had indicated that despite a substantial decrease of 6.2 per cent in the value of oil exports during 1978 compared with 1977, the value is expected to increase by about 38.4 per cent during 1979. This is attributed to the increase in oil prices rather than production. Gas exports are not expected to achieve a quick growth due to the expected increase in the local use of gas for industrial purposes. The value of other exports and re-exports is expected to reach 4.88 billion dirhams in 1979 compared with 4.22 billions in 1978, an increase of 15.6 per cent. The value of imports totalled 1.7 billion dirhams during the first half of 1979 compared to 9.2 billion dirhams during the second half of 1978. Invisible accounts which had registered a deficit of 10.74 billion dirhams in 1978, registered a deficit of 4.88 billion dirhams during the first half of 1979. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 15 Nov 79 p 1]

BRITISH PATROL BOATS--The first 10 fast patrol boats, due to be delivered to the U.A.E.'s Interior Ministry by the end of the year, has been launched in Britain. Built of GRP (glass reinforced plastic), the 11.8 metre diesel powered vessels are to be used for immigration control. They are being made by Watercraft of Sussex and are based on the firm's P-1200 fast patrol boat design and have a top speed of 21 knots. Fitted with radar and VHF radio telephone, each boat can accommodate four crew and up to six immigration control officers. Watercraft will provide spares and after-sales support for the UAE boats. Other Middle East orders include two 14-metre patrol boats for the Omani police. [Text] [Manama GULF MIRROR in English 4-9 Nov 79 p 45]

FUJAYRAH CEMENT PLANT--Fujeirah's new cement factory--the sixth in the UAE--will have a capital of Dh350 million. There will be 70 million shares at Dh5 each. The factory, which is being built at Dibba, will have a yearly capacity of 530,000 tons. Fujeirah Amiri Court president Saliman Al Jassim, told the Emirates News Agency this week that the Abu Dhabi government, the Fujeirah government and the Islamic Development Bank will be taking big shares in the company, with the remainder offered for public subscription. Work will start soon on the factory which is likely to be completed within two years. Raw materials for production will come from the nearby mountains. [Text] [Manama GULF MIRROR in English 10-16 Nov 79 p 39]

ALUMINUM SMELTER START-UP--Dabai's \$1 billion aluminium smelter began limited production last week, in preparation for next January, when it is due to start maximum output of 135,000 tonnes a year. Built by British Smelter Construction, the plant is designed to employ 1,600 workers; it includes a 515MW power station and a desalination plant with a capacity of 25 million gallons of fresh water a day. The gas-fuelled smelter, which uses ore from a bauxite refinery in Western Australia, is 80 per cent owned by the government of Dubai and 20 per cent by Alusmelter Holdings, which is joint owned by Alcan UK and Southwire Co of Georgia, in the US. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 19 Nov 79 p 7]

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WESTERN SAHARA

SAHARAN LEADER SAYS SPANISH POLICY FULL OF CONTRADICTIONS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 26 Oct 79 p 3

[Interview with POLISARIO Secretary General Bachir Mustafa Sayed by M.O.; date and place not given]

[Text] Hassi Budjama (Western Sahara)--The POLISARIO Front deeply regrets the timidity and "contradictions" of Spanish foreign policy and appeals to President Suarez "not to dirty his image." These were the words of POLISARIO Secretary General Bachir Mustafa Sayed in an exclusive interview granted to EL PAIS.

Bachir stressed the fact that neither the SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] nor the POLISARIO Front wish to interfere in Spanish affairs. "I ask you," he said, "not to have my words interpreted as interference...."

The relations between the POLISARIO Front and the Spanish government party and, therefore, with the administration of President Suarez, are really strained, but the historic relations between the two peoples cannot be destroyed. Bachir feels that the position of the Spanish Government is contradictory, that it suffers from too many twists and does not take a firm attitude.

Saharan leaders believed that President Suarez "who has a unblemished record as a statesman," would have the courage to erase the blot made by the previous cabinet.

"Spain changes directions constantly in its policy toward us. It turns from 180° to 90°. Spain wants to be friends with everybody, but its friendship is defined by an interpretation of the trilateral agreement and its consequences, which is the same as being in favor of Morocco...."

Question: Why do you insist on this?

Answer: Perhaps because Spain is tied to France and the United States too much and is not free in its movements. The proof that Spain "clings" to the spirit of the trilateral agreement is that it has not changed its

outside action in this matter, even after the signing of a peace treaty between our country and Mauritania.

Question: Does the POLISARIO Front feel affected by the recent vote in the Spanish Parliament?

Answer: It has been a painful surprise for us to see this attitude of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] and that these discussions were held precisely when the United Nations is meeting, and we ask ourselves, why make these statements if not to influence the debates on the Saharan problem at the General Assembly.

Question: Do you believe the President Suarez is personally responsible for this policy?

Answer: Of course. Suarez is the head of this government that defines this policy. The president of the Spanish cabinet is responsible for its present policy. It cannot be conceived that he holds a different position from the one expressed by his minister Marcelino Oreja, nor can it be imagined that the latter when he speaks, does not state the latest Spanish position.

Question: President Carter has decided to authorize the sale of weapons to Morocco. This will create a new situation for the POLISARIO Front....

Answer: Every time Morocco was on the verge of negotiating with us, imperialist powers have found justification to force a new intransigent position from Rabat. Washington tries to solve the Moroccan situation "Zaire style" and this can only be explained by its deliberate desire to exterminate our people. We shall never agree to negotiate under a threat, regardless of what kind it is.

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WESTERN SAHARA

KING, OPPOSITION DISAGREE ABOUT WAGING SAHARAN WAR

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 28 Oct 79 p 7

[Article by Domingo Del Pino]

[Text] Rabat--Some 4 years after the green march, the "marriage Italian style" between King Hassan II and the Moroccan opposition forces begins to enter into real "divorce proceedings." The way of conducting the confrontation in the civilian and military fields, and the growing internationalization of the conflict are the immediate reasons which seem destined to lead, in spite of the seriousness of the situation, to a new period of animosity between the Moroccan palace and the opposition.

Although in a general way socialists and communists accept the fact that Morocco may get weapons wherever they are offered, both political parties have violently reacted to what seems to them an attempt of the government to present the war in Sahara as the result of East-West confrontation and, therefore, make the Western world believe that to defend Morocco will be to its advantage in the economic and strategic sphere.

The communists in their newspaper AL BAYANE said yesterday that the "war is not won with 12 helicopters that fly at 300 km per hour and 6 planes which, although they have sophisticated electronic equipment, do not fly faster than 400 km per hour." As if completing this statement, the socialists believe, according to an editorial in their weekly LIBERATION, that what is needed is "firm political will."

This political will, which is lacking according to the USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces] made the socialist deputies withdraw from the Parliament last Wednesday when a proposal made by the group demanding a serious debate about the situation in Sahara, the economic situation and repression, was not taken into consideration.

The opposition has totally dissociated itself from the presentation of the conflict made by the government. Official press in the last few days, has pretended that what is happening is a communist plot and King Hassan

II himself has allegedly told a U.S. navy officer that if the regime in Morocco changes the United States would have to ground its Mediterranean fleet.

The communists and socialists radically differ from this interpretation of the government. They not only feel that U.S. weapons--which for the time being are nothing but a promise--are not going to resolve the course of the war but, added LIBERATION, Morocco cannot allow itself the luxury of disregarding the entire socialist public opinion.

The socialist and communist analysis is that in spite of the fact that USSR supports the right of self-determination and has received an Algerian military delegation, France, Spain, and even the United States also recognize it, and weapons and equipment of these two first countries are also being used by the POLISARIO Front.

Furthermore, while the EEC does not support Morocco, said LIBERATION, no European socialist country has recognized the POLISARIO Front, although Cuba, Vietnam, Madagascar and Mozambique do recognize it, as well as Liberia, Panama, Mexico, Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria, "which have close relations with the United States."

#### Chinese Weapons

This ambiguity that the Moroccan political parties allege in order not to accept the idea that this is an East-West conflict, is to a certain degree confirmed by the attitudes of the countries that supply weapons and political support to the belligerents. While North Korea, which is pro-China, recognizes the SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic], Morocco has received a shipment of Chinese weapons this weekend. If the USSR supplies the POLISARIO Front through Algeria and Libya, Romania sells weapons to Morocco with Moscow's approval. The United States at the same time as it promises to equip Morocco, sends to Algeria no less than its national security adviser Brzezinski.

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WESTERN SAHARA

AOSARIO DELEGATION ADDRESSES MOROCCAN WORKERS' GROUP IN PARIS

LD111614 Rabat MAP in English 1219 GMT 11 Dec 79 LD

[Text] Paris, Dec 11 (MAP)--The Association of the Saharan Natives, formerly under Spanish rule (AOSARIO), attended here a meeting organized by the representatives of the Moroccan workers' association established in France.

During this meeting, the delegation read a message addressed by its militants to all their compatriots forming the Moroccan colony in Europe. In their message, the AOSARIO militants namely said that "the peoples smitten with justice and freedom are now aware of the fact that the military aggressions of the Algerian army, helped by international mercenaries, financed by Tripoli, are threatening peace and stability in the whole region.

"These same countries, added the militants, display active and multilateral efforts, urging the Algerian leaders to put an end to their escapade of war and to release the hundreds of our families sequestered in the Algerian concentration camps."

"However, the militants went on, the Algerian leaders seem to prefer the language of guns to that of wisdom and Arab and Islamic brotherhood."

"Thus, we must, of all of us, be united in order to face these known enemies, and prevent them from sowing confusion in our ranks," concluded the message.

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END